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ABSTRACT 
Since January 2005 Pakistan’s Baluchistan province has been embroiled in a rash 
of violence that threatens to deteriorate into civil war.  Is this recent violence yet another 
recurrence of state-periphery tensions, or is it a qualitatively new phenomenon which 
threatens U.S. and Pakistan interests in the region?  This thesis analyzes the historical 
causes of Baluch political violence in order to determine why Baluchistan is again 
enmeshed in bloody conflict.  Violence in Baluchistan historically has been the product 
of several factors:  a fiercely independent Baluch people that eschew outside interference; 
the lasting legacy of British policy; mismanagement by ruling Pakistani regimes; and 
historical grievances that have allowed Baluch leaders to mobilize support for their 
nationalist cause.  The argument of this thesis, however, is that the particular timing of 
the most recent surge of violence in Baluchistan is a result of a change in the relationship 
between the central government and Baluchistan brought about by the province’s 
growing strategic significance.  While the United States currently views the conflict in 
Baluchistan as an internal matter, growing violence and continued instability in a region 
where the presence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda is widespread makes this a crisis worthy 
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In 1973, with Pakistan’s central government still reeling from the stinging defeat 
that resulted from the succession of East Pakistan and the creation of an independent 
Bangladesh in 1971, ethnic nationalists in Pakistan’s southwestern province of 
Baluchistan began a bloody four-year insurgency that threatened to further dismember 
Pakistan and destabilize all of southwest Asia.  Now, three decades after the rebellion 
was put down by the government forces of President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Baluch 
nationalist zeal has again sparked a wave of violence that threatens to explode into a full- 
blown insurrection with vast implications not only for Pakistan and other regional 
players, but for the United States and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
But what is the cause of this latest resurgence of nationalist violence in 
Baluchistan?  Baluch leaders such as tribal chief Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti argue that the 
current violence is a product of decades of exploitation of the Baluch people at the hands 
of the Pakistani central government.  He and other Baluch nationalists point to inequities 
in natural gas royalties, the influx of large numbers of non-Baluch workers into the 
province, and an increased military presence as evidence that the central government is 
set on reducing the Baluch people to “slaves and third grade citizens” in their own land.1 
The central government, on the other hand, labels the violence in Baluchistan as the work 
of a small band of “miscreants,”  led by a few militant tribal leaders who do not represent 
the majority of the Baluch population and whose efforts to undermine the development of 
Baluchistan are purely aimed at maintaining the “backward” feudal tribal system from 
which they garner their great power and wealth.2  Which of these arguments is correct?  
Is the current violence in Baluchistan driven by a mass based movement spawned from 
historical and present day grievances, or is it simply a product of elite manipulation by 
tribal Sardars attempting to hold onto power?   
                                                 
1 Nawab Akhbar Khan Bugti.   Interview posted on www.balochvoice.com, 1 August 2003, accessed  
30 April 2006. 
2 “English Rendering of President's Address to the Nation" Associated Press of Pakistan, 17 January 
2006 accessed from www.fbis.gov, 17 January 2006. 
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The purpose of this thesis project is to analyze the root causes of Baluch violence 
throughout history in an effort to determine why Baluchistan is once again embroiled in a 
bloody clash between ethnic Baluch tribesmen and the forces of the Pakistani state.  
Violence in Baluchistan throughout its history has been the product of several 
contributing factors:  a fiercely independent Baluch people that eschew outside 
interference in their affairs; the lasting legacy of the techniques and policies implemented 
by the British during their century long rule of British India; mismanagement by ruling 
Pakistani regimes; and real and perceived historical grievances that have allowed Baluch 
leaders to mobilize support for the nationalist cause.  The fundamental argument of this 
thesis, however, is that the critical factor that has determined the particular timing of past 
insurrections, and the most recent surge of violence in Baluchistan, is the existence of a 
major change in the dynamic between the central government and Baluchistan.  In other 
words, the fundamental contributing factor to violence in Baluchistan has been a change 
in the status quo.  Throughout history, this change has been brought about because of 
both internal and external pressures on the Pakistani government that pushed the ruling 
elite toward major policy decisions that exacerbated existing grievances, and ultimately 
spawned violence.   
In order to support this argument, this thesis provides a historical analysis of 
Baluchistan, its nationalist movement, and instances of major violence, over three 
significant periods:  during the rule of the British in the nineteenth century; from the 
partition of British India in 1947 until the conclusion of the fourth Baluch revolt in 1977; 
and from the beginning of the current unrest in January 2005 to the present.  The intent of 
this historical analysis is to not only to provide for a comprehensive understanding of the 
various factors which have contributed to violent outbreaks in Baluchistan throughout its 
history, but more specifically, to determine the reasons behind the current spate of 
violence that threatens to drag Pakistan into a civil war.     
B. BACKGROUND 
In December of 2005, after numerous attacks by Baluch tribesmen on the natural 
gas pipeline near the Baluch town of Sui, as well as rocket attacks directed at President 
Musharraf’s entourage during a visit to the Baluch city of Kohlu, the Pakistani 
government launched a large military operation to rid the province of the “miscreants” it 
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believes are set on disrupting the government’s aggressive development projects.  
Pakistani officials have downplayed the increasing Baluch violence as the acts of a few 
malcontents who do not represent the population as a whole.  But despite the increased 
involvement of central government forces, violence has continued.  The unrest in 
Baluchistan has steadily increased since January of 2005 when the failure of the Pakistani 
government to bring four Pakistani soldiers to trial for the alleged rape of a local female 
doctor sparked attacks on the Sui gas fields by Baluch tribesman.  This increased 
violence, as well as the emergence of more violent nationalist organizations such as the 
Baluchistan National Army, threaten to plunge the province into a bloody civil war—
with dire consequences for both Pakistan and the region. 
The rugged and sparsely populated province of Baluchistan has been home to 
numerous insurrections since Pakistan’s formation in 1947.  Like those in 1948, 1959, 
1962, and 1973, the current uprising in Baluchistan has implications that go far beyond 
the region.  The province of Baluchistan is economically and strategically important, not 
only to the central government of Pakistan, but to other regional and global powers 
including India, Iran, China, and the United States.  For Pakistan, Baluchistan provides 
vast mineral and energy resources—thirty-six percent of Pakistan’s total natural gas 
production, coal, gold, copper, silver, platinum, aluminum and uranium come from the 
Baluchistan province.3  Baluchistan is also the potential transit zone for two 
economically beneficial international pipelines (Iran to India and Turkmenistan to India), 
and home to two of Pakistan’s three naval bases (Gwadar and Ormara).  In addition to 
providing Pakistan with the rights to the largest deep water port in the region, and the 
potential for millions in revenue, Gwadar, will provide Pakistan with strategic depth that 
their main naval base at Karachi—which has been blockaded by Pakistan’s arch rival 
India in the past—does not.4  Additionally, Baluchistan’s vast land area provides the 
                                                 
3 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan:  The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,” Carnegie Papers 65 (January 
2006):  4. 
4 Iran’s Chabahar port, built with Indian assistance, is the other major port within the region.  While 
Chabahar lacks the capacity of Gwadar, it still competes with Gwadar over which port will serve as Central 
Asia’s main conduit to warm water ports.  For more see Ziad Haider, “Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan’s 
Gwadar Port,” in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Winter/Spring 2005, 95-103. 
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central government with the ability to disperse its expanding strategic arsenal in order to 
increase its survivability from any potential attack by its arch-rival India.5   
While the government of General Pervez Musharraf is steadfast in its belief that 
its program for development in Baluchistan will benefit both the local Baluch and 
Pakistan as a whole, many Baluch nationalists argue otherwise.  They point to the fact 
that Baluchistan was the last province to be granted access to Baluchistan’s vast gas 
resources, as well as what they view as a disproportionately low percentage of the energy 
revenue produced from within their border, as evidence of the central government’s 
deliberate policy of exploitation.  Another point of contention among nationalists is the 
development of the port city of Gwadar.  While the central government argues that the 
massive port project will provide opportunity and great benefits to Baluchistan, many 
Baluch are concerned that they will be left on the sidelines as jobs and revenue go to 
outsiders—principally the Punjabis who dominate the government in Islamabad.  The 
natural gas issue and the Gwadar project are only two of numerous contested issues 
between the Baluch and Pakistan’s central government, but they are representative of the 
basic grievance that has led to increased violence and unrest in recent years.  Put simply, 
the Baluch desire more say and less interference with their political and economic 
destiny.  Unfortunately, the divergent views of Baluch nationalists and the central 
government continue to push the crisis towards the precipice. 
If the violence in Baluchistan escalates into civil war, each of the above 
mentioned powers would be forced to reevaluate its regional goals as well as its specific 
methods for attaining them.  It would follow then that each is interested in avoiding any 
such calamity.  Yet so far, the escalating violence in Baluchistan has caused little reaction 
outside of Pakistan except in India where the Indian government has criticized Pakistan’s 
handling of the volatile situation and not surprisingly linked it to the ongoing peace talks 
between the two adversaries.  The rest of the world, however, has seemed content to let 
the government of President Pervez Musharraf handle the situation as it sees fit.   
Pakistan’s solution to the expanding Baluchistan crisis seems to be two pronged.  
First, the central government continues to push ahead with several massive development 
                                                 
5 From an interview conducted with Brig. Feroz Khan, 1 June 2005. 
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projects—the Gwadar port as well as major dam and road projects—which it believes 
will bring prosperity to all of Pakistan, including Baluchistan.  Simultaneously it has used 
military and para-military forces to crush what it views as a small number of 
“miscreants,” led by greedy tribal leaders, set on keeping Baluchistan underdeveloped 
and backwards.  The Baluch nationalists view the central government’s development 
projects as further examples of the long history of the “colonization” of Baluchistan in 
which the Punjabis—who dominate both the government and military hierarchy—seek to 
exploit the province at the expense of the Baluch people.6  Additionally, they view the 
central government’s recent military operations as heavy handed and simply an excuse to 
oppress the local Baluch and establish a more robust military presence within the 
province—something the Baluch fiercely oppose.7       
While not impossible, it is unlikely—save the injection of massive support from 
an outside player—that the current Baluch nationalist movement will result in an 
independent Baluchistan.  Furthermore, it is unclear that the nationalists even desire this 
as their ultimate goal.  What is more possible, and increasingly likely however, is that 
prolonged and escalating violence will continue to plague Baluchistan and as a result, 
disrupt the national endeavors of Pakistan and the region’s major players.  This is clearly 
a state of affairs that Pakistan, as well as the United States, wishes to avoid.   
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BALUCH PROBLEM 
During his March 2006 trip through South Asia, President George W. Bush 
described the efforts of Pakistan in the fight against terror as “unfaltering.”8  While his 
comments came at a time of growing tensions between the United States and Pakistan 
over U.S. cooperation with India on nuclear technology, and U.S. concerns that Pakistan 
is not doing enough to secure its porous border with Afghanistan, President Bush’s praise 
for the Musharraf regime highlights the ongoing importance of Pakistan as a crucial 
partner of the United States in the Global War on Terror.   
                                                 
6 Grare, 3. 
7 B. Raman, “The Baluch Resistance Movement,” South Asia Analysis Group, 15 Aug 2004, accessed 
from www.saag.org/papers11/paper1087.html on 5 January 2006. 
8 Terrance Hunt, “Bush:  Pakistan Steadfast in War on Terror,” Associated Press Online, 4 March 
2006, accessed from www.web.lexis-nexis.com on 16 May 2006. 
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The events of 9/11 not only altered the relationship of the United States and 
Pakistan, but also between Pakistan and the people of its western borderland.  In the wake 
of 9/11, the United States put heavy pressure on the Pakistani government to exert 
increased control over its western provinces and federally administered tribal areas—
regions previously left nearly untouched by the central government.  Pakistan responded 
with large scale military operations along its western border area to crack down on 
Islamic militants—including both Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters—but this required that 
the central government override long standing local autonomy arrangements with tribal 
leaders who have historically held sway over that region.  The reluctance of Baluch 
tribesman to give up their local autonomy and their desire for increased control over local 
governance and resources has led to a resurgence of violence by Baluch nationalist 
groups that threatens to destabilize the already fragile state of Pakistan.   
Future stability in Pakistan depends on many factors but an equitable solution to 
the emerging Baluchistan crisis is surely one of them.  Ultimately, no one gains from a 
prolonged and bloody insurrection and a prompt resolution is in the best interest of all 
players—the Baluch, Pakistan, the United States and the entire region.  For the Baluch, a 
stable Pakistan will be better able to focus on economic development—one of their 
primary grievances.  An independent Baluchistan, while ideal in the eyes of some Baluch, 
would not be granted without a long bitter fight with the central government that would 
only prolong the Baluch people’s suffering.  For Pakistan, an independent Baluchistan 
would open the flood gates for other irredentist claims that would threaten to dismember 
a state that has struggled since its creation to establish a Pakistani “nation” and maintain 
control over its ethnically diverse population.  Additionally, the economic and strategic 
importance of Baluchistan makes stability there indispensable to future Pakistani success.   
With regards to other regional players, neither Iran nor Afghanistan desires an 
independent Baluchistan and continued unrest will only exacerbate current border 
security issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  For the United States, Pakistan’s 
support for military operations in Afghanistan as well as the efforts of Pakistan’s police 
and military to crackdown on terrorists within its borders have been crucial to the U.S. 
led Global War on Terror.  While there is as of yet no clear evidence that Baluch 
tribesmen have united with the large number of Taliban and Al Qaeda currently operating 
7 
in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, this possibility only adds to the 
potential danger that the growing crisis could effect stability in the region. 
Any increased instability in Pakistan could ultimately lead to a regime change that 
could critically hinder U.S. efforts in the region.  More broadly, a strong, stable and 
democratic Pakistan could act as an example of democracy to the rest of the Muslim 
World—a role Iraq and Afghanistan are still years from fulfilling.  While Pakistan may 
be far from that example today, its future stability—at least in the near term—relies 
heavily on the policy choices of President Pervez Musharraf.  With respect to 
Baluchistan, it is yet unclear whether the central government’s solution to the crisis—
combining massive development projects with firm military operations to crush militant 
Baluch nationalists—is having the desired effect and the steady increase in violence 
within Baluchistan since early 2005 indicates that the central government would be wise 
to revaluate its approach.  Failure to do so may plunge Pakistan into civil war. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The three specific time periods addressed in this thesis were chosen because they 
encompass the periods of greatest violence in Baluchistan.  While the various Baluch 
tribes never united in their struggles against British authority, nineteenth century 
Baluchistan was riddled with clashes between Baluch tribesmen and the British Indian 
Army.9  The partition of British India in 1947 was followed by three decades of bloody 
conflict between the central government and militant Baluch nationalists that included 
four organized insurrections.  After nearly thirty years of relative peace following the 
bloodless coup that brought General Zia ul-Huq to power in 1977, violence once again 
returned to Baluchistan in January of 2005.   
In addition to violence, each of these periods included at least one major policy 
shift, or decision, by the ruling regime—either British or Pakistani—that had a direct 
impact on the level of violence in Baluchistan.  Under British rule, violence surged after 
the Frontier of Separation policy was abandoned for of the Closed Border policy.  
Violence subsided after Sir Robert Sandeman’s Forward Policy was instituted in the late 
nineteenth century, only to have it surge again after partition of British India in 1947.  
                                                 
9 James W. Spain, “Political Problems of a Borderland” in  Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, ed. 
Ainslee T. Embree (Karachi:  Royal Book Company, 1979), 4. 
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The Pakistani government’s effort to centralize power and end ethnic division by 
instituting the One Unit Policy was followed by nearly three decades of violence.  One 
Unit and other policy decisions, including the dismissal on two separate occasions of the 
democratically elected Baluch provincial government, sparked violent uprisings that 
often took years to quell.  General Zia ul-Huq’s policy of “non-provocative firmness,” 
instituted in the wake of a bloody four year Baluch insurgency, brought a period of 
relative peace to Baluchistan that went uninterrupted for nearly thirty years.  Yet the 
onset of the Global War on Terror in the wake of the events of 9/11, and the subsequent 
decision to begin several major development projects in Baluchistan demanded that the 
central government abandon “non-provocative firmness” and reassert its authority over 
Baluchistan—the result has been the latest wave of violence.   
The three time periods analyzed in this thesis collectively build the case that the 
most recent spate of violence in Baluchistan is the product of several factors that have 
existed since 1947:  the impact of British rule, a perceived legacy of betrayal, misguided 
policies of the central government, and both real and perceived grievances regarding 
economic exploitation and ethnic dispossession that have been utilized by Baluch leaders 
to mobilize support for the nationalist cause.  Yet the analysis in the chapters below will 
also demonstrate that most, if not all of the above factors have existed since 1947.  The 
factor that explains the specific timing of past revolts, and the burgeoning insurrection in 
Baluchistan today, is a change in the status quo of the relationship between the central 
government and its Baluchistan province.     
E. ROADMAP 
In order to understand the various factors that have led to the resurgence of 
Baluch nationalism in recent years—and the violence that has been associated with it—it 
is first necessary to appreciate the history of the Baluch people.  Chapter II of this thesis 
expands on the brief background provided above by examining the unique character of 
the Baluch people, the influences (both internal and external) that shaped their early 
history, and the impact of British rule on the political memory of the Baluch people.  The 
main finding of this chapter is that ineffective British techniques for dealing with the 
tribal people of their western border area exacerbated a deep seated suspicion of outsiders 
that has been part of the Baluch ethos for centuries.  Additionally, the incessant violence 
9 
between the British Raj and Baluch tribesmen during the nineteenth and early 20th 
century served as a precursor to the violence to come. 
Chapter III concentrates on Pakistan’s first three decades of independence after 
the partition of British India and details how the misguided choices of several Pakistani 
governments exacerbated the grievances of the Baluch people and ultimately led to 
violence.  Specifically, this chapter addresses the difficulties of state formation in 
Pakistan; the shortcomings of government policies such as One Unit and Basic 
Democracies; as well as the specific actions taken by the central government that 
contributed to growing discontent among the Baluch people that manifested itself in 
armed insurrection.  The major finding of this chapter is that several key policy decisions 
by the central government between 1947 and 1977 contributed to growing feelings of 
exploitation and marginalization among Baluch that had a direct impact on the outbreak 
of violence.    
Chapter IV encompasses an analysis of the current violence in Baluchistan.  This 
chapter first examines the main issues that remain in dispute between the Baluch and the 
central government in order to determine their impact on the current crisis.  Second, this 
chapter analyzes the ethnic dimension of the conflict in order to identify how and why 
Baluch tribesmen have been mobilized to take up arms against their central government.  
Finally, this chapter examines the various factors which have increased the strategic 
significance of Baluchistan—the Global War on Terror, the deep-sea port in Gwadar, and 
the regional dynamics of Southwest Asia—in order to highlight how these events have 
led to a change in policy and the exacerbation of existing tensions.  The findings of 
Chapter IV support the conclusion that the policy shifts of the Musharraf regime in the 
wake of 9/11, and the decision to develop a deep-water port in the Baluch city of Gwadar, 
exacerbated existing problems within the province and ultimately led to the current crisis.   
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the project’s findings and offers policy 
recommendations for both Pakistan and the United States with regards to the violent 


























II. FROM THE KHAN TO THE CROWN:  THE LASTING 
LEGACY OF BRITISH RULE ON BALUCHISTAN 
 
Figure 1.   Figure 1. Baluchistan under British rule10 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1833, Lord William Bentick, the chief administrator of the government of 
British India, led an effort to push the crown’s influence west into the frontier of Sind and 
Punjab.  While control of this area was key to the expansion of British trade in Central 
Asia, it would also counter Russian expansion from the north and allay British fears that 
Russian influence in the area would turn the local tribes against British rule.  According 
to Bentick, not only would the expansion of influence to the west secure British 
                                                 
10 J.G. Bartholomew, Baluchistan (Imperial gazetteer of India. New edition, published under the 
authority of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907-1909) 
accessed from http://dsal.uchicago.edu/maps/gazetteer/index.html on 10 June 2006. 
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dominance in the region but it would also usher in “a new era of civilization, happiness 
and of blessing” to the peoples of the western borderlands.11  Yet the task of controlling 
the frontier area on colonial India’s western border proved to be a tremendous challenge 
as frontier administrators including Edwardes, Taylor, James, Lumsden, Mackleson, and 
Abbot would find as they were forced to put down some semblance of a rebellion nearly 
every year between 1849 and 1947.12   
During their century-long rule over South Asia the British employed several 
techniques of administration in an effort to effectively maintain control over the restive 
tribes of the western borderlands.  These methods included the “Frontier of Separation,” 
which combined techniques of direct control and negotiated alliances; the “Closed Border 
System,” which attempted to exert direct control over local tribesmen; and the “Forward 
Policy,” which attempted to establish control through a technique dubbed “peaceful 
penetration.”  Which of these techniques was most successful?  Perhaps more 
importantly, what has been the lasting impact of these policies on both the Baluch people 
and the subsequent Pakistani governments that sought to bring the restive western border 
area under their control?  An analysis of these techniques, the reasons they were 
employed, and the level of success each policy incurred, is crucial to understanding the 
subsequent policies of the Pakistani government after 1947.   
The primary conclusion drawn from the analysis in this chapter is that the most 
successful British technique for administering control over the tribal people of its western 
frontier was the “Forward Policy.”  While this policy reinforced the power and autonomy 
of the tribal chiefs, and as a result laid the foundation for subsequent conflict between the 
Baloch and the Pakistani central authority,13 it also proved to be the most successful 
technique to maintain peace, foster development, and provide for substantial levels of 
government influence.  For reasons that will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the 
central government of Pakistan abandoned the techniques of the “Forward Policy” in the 
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years following independence and attempted to more directly exert their control over 
Baluchistan.  This reversion to a policy a kin to the Closed Border system resulted in four 
armed revolts during nearly three decades of violence in Baluchistan between 1947 and 
1977. 
Today, much like its British predecessors, the Pakistani government continues to 
struggle with the proper balance between central government authority and the traditional 
tribal system that has dominated the region for centuries.  This chapter analyzes the 
lasting legacy of the clash between British imperial rule and the tribal system which 
dominates Baluchistan in order to gain perspective on the current clash between 
Pakistan’s central government and militant Baluch nationalists.  In order to fully 
understand the uneasy and often volatile relationship between the central government and 
the tribal people who inhabit its southwestern province it is first necessary to understand 
the Baluch as a people.  As such, this chapter begins with an examination of the harsh 
geography that encompasses Baluchistan.  It continues with an analysis of the customs 
and traditions that define the Baluch as a people as well as an account of the Baluch 
tribes and their tribal system.  Next, this chapter explores the early political development 
and foreign influences that shaped the political landscape in Baluchistan and concludes 
with an examination of the various techniques used by the British during their century 
long rule over the tribal areas of present day Pakistan. 
B. GEOGRAPHY 
The province of Baluchistan comprises over 134,000 square miles of rugged and 
inhospitable land.  It is divided into four major areas known as the Upper Highlands, the 
Lower Highlands, the Plains and the Deserts.  The Upper Highlands, known as Khorasan, 
is a mountainous region that falls within the central and east central portion of the 
province.  The Lower Highlands are bracketed by three mountain ranges:  the Mekran, 
Kharan, and Chaghi.  The Plains is a region that is further subdivided into areas known as 
Kachhi, Las Bela, and the Dasht River valley.  The Deserts make up the northwest 
portion of the region and are marked by their unique mixture of sand and black gravel.14   
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Baluchistan is bordered on the north and east by its respective provincial 
neighbors, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab, and Sindh.  To the west is 
Afghanistan and Iran and to the South is the Arabian Sea.  Baluchistan, NWFP and the 
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) make up Pakistan’s Western borderlands—
an area that stretches from the Arabian Sea north along the eastern edge of the Iranian 
plateau to the mountainous area of the Hindu Kush and the Pamir mountains.15  
Baluchistan has over 470 miles of coast line but possesses no rivers that run year round 
and it receives less than five inches of rainfall a year.  It is a region that can be described 
as “bleak and inhospitable,” arid, rugged, and harsh.16  Temperatures in Baluchistan 
range from frigid (-40 degrees C) to sweltering (130 degrees C).  The stark contrast 
between its rugged mountains and arid expanses of semi-desert wasteland has resulted in 
a unique people, whose tribal structure, traditions and customs reflect the harsh 
environment in which they live.   
C. CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS 
The province of Baluchistan is multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural.  Due 
to the barren and infertile physical environment, the people of Baluchistan have 
historically been nomadic, although in recent years many tribes have abandoned their 
nomadic ways and settled permanently.  In addition to Baluchi, several other languages 
are spoken within the province including Brahui, Pashto, Sindhi, and Saraiki.  The 
Baluch, Brahui, and Pathans are all Muslim, yet the Baluch tend to be more casual in 
their observance than the more “fanatical Pathans.”17    While each of the ethnic groups 
that populate Baluchistan have unique characteristics, they all conform to a similar tribal  
culture that values loyalty and hospitality, believes in “an eye for an eye and a life for a 
life” and adheres to the simple rule that “he shall take who has the power, and he shall 
keep who can.”18   
The Baluch have a long tradition glorifying independence, battle, and personal 
bravery and they adhere strictly to a deeply inbred code of honor, Ryvaj, that—very 
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similar to the Pashtoonwali Code adhered to in much of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s 
NWFP and FATA—is grounded in the tenets of revenge, sanctuary, hospitality and 
suspicion of outsiders. 19  Henry Pottinger, a nineteenth century British officer who 
traveled extensively in the western frontier of British India, commented on the Baluch’s 
strict adherence to their code of hospitality and honor in this way:  “When they once 
offer, or promise to afford protection to a person who may require or solicit it, they will 
die before they fail in their trust.”20  A Baluch is bound to honor their code above all 
else—including his life—and it is this code that has frustrated the designs of foreigners 
throughout its history and given the peoples of Baluchistan a cultural and racial 
awareness strong enough to transcend international as well as internal political 
boundaries.21   
D. TRIBES AND THE SARDARI SYSTEM 
The Baluch people can be divided into seventeen groups and some four hundred 
sub-groupings.22  The two major groups are the “Eastern,” or Sulaiman Baluch, and 
“Western,” or Mekran Baluch.  Sulaiman Baluch are the larger of the two groups, but are 
only dominant numerically in one (Sibis District) of Baluchistan’s twenty-six districts, 
and traditionally, the Mekran have been viewed as the “original nucleus” of the Baluch 
people.23  The Sulaiman Baluch include the Bugtis, Buledis, Buzdars, Dombkis, Kaheris, 
Khetrans, Magasis, Marris, Mugheris, Rinds and Umranis tribes while the Mekran are 
made up of the Buledi, Dashti, Gichki, Kandai, Rais, Rakhshani, Rind, Sangu and 
Sanjrani.24  While the Rind tribe is first in the social hierarchy of the Baluch tribes, the 
two tribes which have become dominant in modern Baluch politics, and been at the 
center of the recent unrest, have been the Bugtis and Marris.   
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Within the Large Brahui population, concentrated in the central mountain region 
south of the Baluch capital of Quetta, there are three subdivisions:  the Brahui nucleus, 
the Jhalawan Brahuis, and the Sarawan Brahuis.  The Brahui nucleus tribes include the 
Achmadzai, Gurguari, Iltazai, Kalandari, Kambrani, Mirwari, Rodeni, and Sumalari.  The 
Achmadzai tribe occupies the top of the social hierarchy among Brahui, and is the tribe of 
the Khan of Kalat, but a Jhalawan tribe, the Mengels, have become the most powerful 
player in Baluchistan politics. 
The basic political organization in Baluchistan is the tribe and their loyalty is to 
the tribal chief.  Their traditional form of government is the Sardari system: a centuries 
old system in which tribesmen pledge their allegiance to Sardars, or tribal chiefs, in 
exchange for social justice and the maintenance of the “integrity of tribe.”25  Sardars are 
traditionally elected by a Jirga, or council of elders within a tribe.  The Jirgas are also 
responsible for dispensing justice—and perform the three-fold duties of police, 
magistracy and justice.26  Within Baluchistan, there are four levels of Jirga:  local, 
district, joint and shahi.27  Local Jirgas primarily deal with lesser crimes and disputes 
while district Jirgas deal with more serious crimes such as major theft and murder.  Joint 
Jirgas handle intra-tribe disputes having to do with serious crimes and tribal enmity.  The  
Shahi Jirga, composed of the Sardars of the respective tribes, is reserved for major issues 
or decisions such as the 1947 decision to include British Baluchistan into the nascent 
state of Pakistan.28  
E. EARLY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN INFLUENCES 
The vernacular name for the region that makes up Pakistan’s Western borderlands 
is Yaghistan, “Land of the Unruled.”29  Much of what has made this region so intractable 
has been discussed in the preceding two sections—the dangerous combination of a harsh 
and rugged physical environment; a people with a long tradition of independence and 
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battle; and deep seated code which breeds suspicion of outsiders.  Yet that does not mean 
that Baluchistan has been untouched by foreign influences.  Quite to the contrary, the 
conquest of “great civilizations” including the Greeks, Arabs, Hindus, Turks, and 
Persians all passed through Baluchistan.  The southernmost region of Baluchistan, known 
as Mekram, is an excellent “avenue of approach” that allowed these great civilizations to 
expand and unite their empires from the Middle East to South Asia.  While never truly 
conquered (at least not until the region came under British control in the nineteenth 
century), the area that now comprises Baluchistan fell under the influence of the 
Phoenicians during the second and first millennia BC, various Persian dynasties 
beginning with King Darius in 522, and the Arab Empire after their army’s conquest in 
the seventh century.30   It should also be noted that there was significant influence by the 
Indo-Greeks in the third and second centuries BC, the Hindu Rai Dynasty in the seventh 
century and the Mughal Dynasty in seventeenth and eighteenth century.  Because there 
was limited revenue to be extracted from Baluchistan, these empires had little reason to 
be involved in the day-to-day administration of the region.  Direct involvement of the 
ruling power would increase nominally between the fifteenth and eighteenth century as 
the Baluch tribes were required to provide warriors for royal armies and the need for the 
safe passage of trade through the borderlands became increasingly important.  Yet it 
would not be until the late eighteenth century that any significant political identity would 
begin to take shape in Baluchistan. 
Mir Chakar Rind would, in the fifteenth century, be the first Baluch monarch to 
attempt to unify Baluchistan under a single political entity.  While he would ultimately 
fail in this endeavor, his successful invasion of Punjab in the early part of the sixteenth 
century would solidify him in history as a leader who personified Baluch martial 
virtues.31  Baluchistan would finally become united in 1666 when the Baluch tribes 
elected Mir Ahmad Khan as the ruler (Khan) of the state of Kalat.  Under Ahmad Kahn, 
the Kalat state would extend from Kandahar in Afghanistan, to Bandar Abbas in Iran, 
across present-day Baluchistan to Dera Gahzi Khan in Punjab.  But it would be under the 
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forty year rule of Ahmad Khan’s grandson, Mir Nasir Khan, who ruled from 1741, that 
the institutions of a central government would begin to take shape.  Under Nasir Khan, 
the State of Kalat was divided into two units:  one area that was directly administered by 
the Kahn through administrators (Naibs) which consisted of the territory of Kalat plus 
annexed territory and conquered lands, and a second area composed of two provinces, 
Sarawan and Jhalawan, which were administered independently by Sardars appointed by 
the Khan.32  In exchange for providing military troops to the Kahn, Sardars were 
provided with a fief of land.  At the lower levels of society, each village would elect a 
head, and villages would be grouped together and elect a chief.  Chiefs of individual 
tribes would be elected by the tribal elders, with the Khan reserving the right of 
confirmation.   
Nasir Khan also established the foundations of a bureaucracy which included a 
prime minister, legislative councils (a lower chamber that was chosen by the tribes and an 
upper chamber consisting of tribal elders), and a central tax collector.  Additionally, Nasir 
Khan would establish a centralized code of regulations that incorporated a system to 
settle disputes and gave individuals the right to appeal legal decisions to a higher 
authority.  Unfortunately, the unity created under Nasir Khan would collapse after his 
death in 1805, and his passing would coincide with the emergence of the “Great Game” 
between Russia and Great Britain during which the peoples of Baluchistan would get 
their first taste of British imperial rule. 
F. FRONTIER OF SEPERATION 
From the earliest decades of the nineteenth century, the threat of Russian 
expansion from the north required the British to devise a strategy for bringing the Indian 
frontier under their control.  This fact was recognized by several influential members of 
the British government, most notably Sir Alfred Lyall who served as the Foreign 
Secretary of the Government of India and as Lieutenant-General of the Northwest 
Province.  Lyall’s concept for the administration of the western borderlands, later to be 
echoed by many within the British government including the influential Lord Curzon, 
argued for the creation of a Frontier of Separation.  In contrast to a Frontier of Contact in 
which the British and Russian empires would come into direct conflict, the Frontier of 
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Separation called for a “narrow strip of territory, a few hundred miles across” to provide 
a buffer between the two empires.  This buffer would not only prevent inevitable clashes 
between the Russians and the British but also prevent Russian influence from affecting 
“smoldering discontent” within India.33   
Yet the Frontier of Separation required the British to redefine the forms of 
government utilized to maintain their influence in this newly created buffer zone.  The 
solution would be the Three-fold Frontier.  Under this plan, the First Frontier would be 
composed of the outer edge of directly administered territory.  This area was governed in 
much the same fashion as the rest of British India—the Government of India exercised 
full administrative control and British law and political systems were the norm.  The 
Second Frontier was an area under “indirect control” in which the forms of law and 
administration, especially the systems of taxation, were not applied.34  Day-to-day 
administration in the Second Frontier was left in the in the hands of tribal chieftains but 
the Government of India still maintained some semblance of control—mainly through the 
influence of the army.  These “unadministered areas” were similar in many respect to the 
Princely States of the interior of British India in that they had a certain degree of political 
autonomy.  Yet unlike the Princely States, the Second Frontier was not integrated into 
mainstream Indian life and they maintained a unique sense of separateness that is still 
evident today throughout the western borderlands.   
The Third Frontier represented the outer edge of the British area of influence.  
This area fell beyond any demarcated boundaries and represented the “gray area” that 
provided protectorate or buffer states against Russian influence.  These states were 
independent and only tied to the Government of India through treaties or other forms of 
political obligation.  An example of this would be the Tripartite Treaty of 1838 in which 
the Government of India, the Sind Ruler Ranjit Singh and the Afghan Chieftain Shah 
Shuja came to an agreement that effectively prohibited the Afghan ruler from entering 
into foreign relations without the knowledge of the Government of British India.35  The 
effect would be the alignment of the frontier area with the sub-continent and the British 
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vice central Asia and the Russian Empire.  Yet fears over Russian expansion would 
remain and lead to the First Afghan War in 1839.  This war would end in a British defeat, 
but it would have a lasting effect on British policy in its western frontier. 
G. THE CLOSED BORDER SYSTEM 
Following their defeat in the First Afghan War, the British moved quickly to exert 
more effective control of their western territory and protect themselves, not only from 
Russian encroachment, but from the “restless mountain tribes” that had proved so 
difficult to govern effectively.  Following the annexation of Sind in 1842 and the 
conquest of Punjab in 1849, the British effectively shut down their western border.  For 
the next three decades, the British implemented the “Closed Border System” in which the 
British increased their presence (especially militarily) in areas under their direct control 
and limited their actions in areas not yet pacified to punitive military expeditions against 
rebellious tribes.36  These military expeditions proved to be costly to the British as they 
battled elusive tribesman who harassed army units with sniper fire and hit and run raids.  
Yet because maintaining control of key passes for British trade remained an imperative, 
the British devised a solution that pitted one tribe against another in the hope that the 
resulting feud would keep both tribes too busy to interfere with the safe passage of 
British trade.  While initially successful, this technique would often result, as it did 
during efforts to control the Kholat Pass in 1853, in fighting between clans that was so 
widespread that passes had to remain closed until alternate settlements could be reached.   
When all other alternatives proved fruitless, the British implemented a concept of 
collective responsibility in which entire tribes would be punished for the actions of its 
individuals in an effort to force the tribes to control its members.  This technique included 
the blockading of passes, rounding up and imprisoning of tribesmen, selling off their 
cattle and forcing the tribes to pay for British losses and damages.  Yet the British still 
were unwilling to pay the full price of pacifying the “hill tribes.”  Their limited 
techniques of partial pacification, described above, which also included “scuttle and 
burn” raids of tribal villages, built a deep sense of bitterness among the tribes and a  
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growing desire for revenge against British imperialism.  This had a lasting effect on the 
peoples of the western borderlands and contributed to many of the problems Pakistan 
would encounter almost a century later.   
In the wake of the Second Afghan War (1878-1880), the British came to the 
conclusion that their Closed Border Policy, and its notion that the “trans-border tribes” 
could be controlled using “subsidies, blockade, occasional manipulation of tribal affairs, 
and, when absolutely necessary, punitive expeditions,” had not produced the desired 
effect.37  The result would be a move towards the “Forward Policy,” a policy that would 
have a lasting effect on Baluchistan.   
H. SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN AND THE BRITISH “FORWARD POLICY” 
Sir Robert Sandeman, British administrator of Baluchistan in the late eighteenth 
century implemented a unique version of the Forward Policy that many have argued was 
responsible for British authority taking root “more kindly and rapidly” than in any other 
province of British India.38  The “Sandeman System,” as it came to be known, had as its 
primary objective the welfare of the tribes.  In Sandeman’s view, reflective of the 
traditional view of British presence overseas, the British had a moral obligation to civilize 
and settle the tribes of the frontier.  His technique of “peaceful penetration” was based on 
knowledge, sympathy and the general assumption that “given the chance to improve their 
economic lot, the impoverished hillmen would abandon their predatory habits in favor of 
peaceful one.”39  While this assumption proved to be somewhat naïve, Sandeman did 
pacify much of Baluchistan by providing employment to tribesmen building roads, levies 
and other public works projects.  Aided by a large military contingent—although force 
was never used—Sandeman ultimately secured a treaty with the Khan of Kalat that 
bound his allegiance to the British.   
Much of Sandeman’s success in Baluchistan was a result of the tactics with which 
he extended British influence in the region.  These tactics stressed three fundamental 
concepts:  the active and passive demonstration of British military might; strengthening 
native authorities through increased participation in local administration and in the 
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responsibility for pacifying the land; and maintaining the native authorities’ political and 
economic dependence on the British colonial authorities.40  Sandeman understood that 
the traditional tribal leaders were the best guarantors of peace and order in the tribes and 
offered the British its only viable option for maintaining control of the strategically vital 
region of Baluchistan.  Yet it is also important to note that while Sandeman’s technique 
of “peaceful penetration” may have been more benign, and more successful, than the 
more violent approach utilized in conjunction with the Closed Border Policy, the desired 
end state was the same.  The pacification of the tribal areas in Baluchistan, as well as 
throughout the rest of the western borderlands served, above all else, the interests of the 
British Empire and did little to further the economic or political development of the 
region.   
Sandeman’s success in Baluchistan would lead to his appointment as head of an 
expedition to extend the Forward Policy to the northern areas of the Indian frontier.  The 
ultimate result of this effort would be the establishment of the Durand Line in 1895 and 
the eventual creation of the North West Frontier Province in 1901.  The Forward Policy 
would continue to dominate British administration of the western frontier throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century but even after the partition of British India, the lasting 
legacy of British rule would continue.  As the colonial period came to an end in South 
Asia, three players would emerge as the dominant forces within Baluchi politics:  the 
Sardars, the activists of the nationalist movements, and the Khan of Kalat.  The Sardars 
became increasingly influential under the British Forward Policy and were the primary 
beneficiaries of British subsidies and the jirga-levies system in which British led 
paramilitary corps came under their direct control.  In the first decade of Pakistan, the 
Sardars would enjoy much of the same benefits and political autonomy as they did under 
the British.  But to many Baluch nationalist the Sardars were seen as “divisive, 
oppressive and agents of outside interests.”41  Generally speaking, however, both groups 
supported the Khan of Kalat when he declared Kalat an independent state in 1947.  
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While the Khan of Kalat would ultimately accept accession to Pakistan in April of 
1948, Kalat maintained under Pakistan the same semi-autonomous status it enjoyed under 
the British.   Yet not all parties were happy with the Khan’s decision to accede Kalat and 
shortly after it was announced, the Khan’s brother, Abdul Karim, led a revolt against the 
newly formed government of Pakistan.  Karim’s revolt would be short lived—he would 
ultimately be jailed and not released until 1955—but Pakistan problems in its first decade 
of existence proved to be much larger than a small band of Baluch rebels.   
I. CONCLUSION 
One of the major problems confronting the infant state of Pakistan in the years 
immediately following the partition of British India was how to unify a “nation” that 
before 1947 did not exist in any shape or form.  Nowhere was the challenge of unification 
more difficult than in the western borderlands.  As has been discussed above, the British 
system of governing did little to bring the disparate groups of the frontier together and, 
much to the contrary, the differences between tribes were often reinforced to suit British 
needs.  While it was to the advantage of the British to preserve the tribal system and the 
traditional leadership that dominated the frontier because it allowed them to “rule by 
proxy,” Pakistan viewed the same tribal system as an impediment to the cohesion of the 
Pakistani state.42   
Within Baluchistan, Pakistan retained the British practices of providing subsidies 
to the Khan of Kalat, the Sardars and other privileged persons and using the military to 
maintain law and order.  Unfortunately, the policies of the early Pakistani regimes would 
be far more reflective of the British Closed Border system than that implemented by Sir 
Robert Sandeman.  It would be these practices that would contribute to a growing 
separatist movement as many Baluch began to view the policies of Pakistan’s central 
government as being just as corrupt and inequitable as those of the British.  As a result, 
much of the bitterness and hatred once reserved for the British was now squarely aimed 
at the central government of Pakistan. 
In an attempt to quell the dissent in its western borderlands, unify West Pakistan, 
as well as counter the growing majority of the more homogenous East Pakistan  
(dominated by Bengalis), the regime of General Ayub Khan implemented the One Unit                                                  
42 Scholz, 100. 
24 
Policy in 1955.  As the discussion in the next chapter demonstrates, this policy not only 
represented a failure of the central government to recognize the extent to which the 
traditional tribal system had become entrenched during the century of British imperial 
rule, but, more importantly, represented its failure to heed the hard-learnt lessons of the 
British.  Unfortunately, Ayub Khan’s would not be the last regime to make this mistake. 
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III. BROUGHT TO A BOIL:  THE EVOLUTION OF BALUCH 
NATIONALISM 1947–1977 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1973, less than three decades after the partition of British India and the creation 
of the independent state of Pakistan, the Pakistani central government became embroiled 
in a pitched battle against Baluch militants that left 5,300 Baluch and over 3,000 
Pakistani soldiers dead.43  The Baluch insurgency was ultimately crushed by the forces of 
Pakistani president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but the embers of Baluch discontent that were 
fanned to a flame in the early 1970s have once again ignited into violence in Baluchistan.  
Much like in 1973, the violence today threatens to derail the central government’s 
attempts to assert its authority and establish Pakistan as a strong centralized state.  The 
1973 insurgency was not the first, nor was it the last time Baluch nationalists clashed 
with the central government’s authority, but this seminal event does serve as an excellent 
focal point for analysis of the Baluch nationalist movement.  The 1973 revolt was the 
culmination of years of growing discontent among Baluch nationalists that not only sheds 
considerable light on the underlying causes of Baluch dissatisfaction (both then and 
now), and the impact of various central government policies on Baluchistan, but also the 
potential destructive power of the current clash between Baluch militants and the 
Pakistani army.   
What were the specific causes of the 1973 revolt and what lessons can be drawn 
from it?  In order to answer this question, one must first understand the events that 
precipitated the crisis, as well as the specific policy choices made by the central 
government in addressing it.  The Baluch revolt between 1973 and 1977 pitted militant 
Baluch nationalists against the Pakistani army, but it also highlighted two divergent 
views on the state of affairs in Baluchistan.  Baluch nationalists viewed the central 
government in Islamabad as obtrusively dominating the internal affairs of the province, 
unnecessarily involving the Pakistani armed forces in local conflicts, and parceling out 
Baluch natural resources—in this case the limited amount of arable lands—to Punjabi 
outsiders with ties to the central government.  In the view of the central government, 
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however, Pakistani leader Yahya Khan had lived up to his pledge—which ended the 
Baluch revolt of the 1960s—to concede many of the Baluch demands:  abolishing the 
One Unit Policy, establishing a consolidated Baluch province, and allowing for local 
elections.  Furthermore, in the eyes of the regime in Islamabad, the violence that erupted 
in 1973 had less to do with the assertion of the central government’s authority in 
Baluchistan than it did with the “belligerent and uncompromising” assertions of the tribal 
Sardars who had artificially stimulated discontent among the Baluch people in order to 
maintain their own grip on power.44    
The argument of this chapter is that in the wake of the British withdrawal from 
South Asia in 1947 subsequent central governments alienated Baluch nationalists with 
their misplaced attempts to create a Pakistani national identity and to solidify the central 
government as the supreme authority in Pakistan.  These efforts, which included such 
policies as “One Unit” and “Basic Democracies,” resulted in heightened discontent and 
feelings of alienation among many Baluch nationalists that culminated in the 1973 
insurgency.  Much of this discontent remains and continues to fuel the Baluch nationalist 
movement—and the growing levels of violence—that exists today.   
The 1973 insurgency was a seminal event for both Baluchistan and Pakistan, yet it 
cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the vast difficulties of state 
formation faced by Pakistan in the decades following its creation in 1947.   In order to 
address these difficulties, and their subsequent effect on Baluchistan, this chapter begins 
with a brief analysis of nationalism theory as it applies to state formation in Pakistan and 
Baluchistan.  The chapter follows with a historical analysis of events within Baluchistan 
and the policy decisions of the central government during the period that began with the 
partition of British India in 1947 and ended with the cessation of hostilities between the 
Baluch and the Pakistani Army in 1977.  Specific events and policy measures to be 
analyzed include the One Unit Policy and the Basic Democracies project instituted by 
Ayub Khan during the 1950s; the central governments reaction to the 1973 insurgency; as 
well as the impact of Afghanistan on the Baluch nationalist movement.  But the impact of  
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these events and policies on Baluch nationalism cannot be fully appreciated without first 
understanding some general concepts and theory regarding nationalism and state 
formation.   
B. THE STATE, THE NATION AND NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN 
Baluch nationalism has been at the root of unrest within Pakistan’s southwest 
province since 1947.  But what is Baluch nationalism?  The answer to this question 
begins with an understanding of what scholar Stephen Cohen has called the “idea of 
Pakistan”—the notion that India’s Muslims required a homeland not only for their 
protection but to fulfill their “cultural and civilizational destiny.” 45  This notion was the 
genesis of the movement spearheaded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League 
during the early twentieth century for the creation of an independent Muslim state in 
South Asia.  In theory, Pakistan was to be created as a haven for Muslims—a stable and 
prosperous state where Muslims could live free of persecution from the Hindu majority 
of India.  This theory became reality in 1947 when British rule rescinded from South Asia 
and the independent state of Pakistan was born.  But as Jinnah and the subsequent leaders 
of Pakistan would come to realize, the creation of the state of Pakistan was far easier than 
the creation of the nation of Pakistan.  
Despite the fact that they are commonly used interchangeably, a state is quite 
separate from a nation.  While a state is primarily a political-legal concept—one that can 
be codified by law—a nation is primarily psycho-cultural, and is often harder to identify.  
By one definition, a state is the “principal political unit in the international political 
system corresponding to a territory, a relatively permanent population, and a set of ruling 
institutions.”46  A nation, in contrast, is “the largest group that can command a person’s 
loyalty because of felt kinship ties.”  Put another way, a nation is a group of people who 
view the other members of their group as their “fully extended family” and who possess a 
“common destiny” normally associated with claims on a particular territory.47  But it is 
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essential here to also recognize what nationalism is not.  Nationalism is not simply 
patriotism, and it should not be equated purely with ethnic politics.  While the political 
mobilization of people based on ethnicity can be a starting point, ethnic politics alone is 
not nationalism.  Nationalism may encompass many of the same goals, but it goes further 
than pure ethnic politics.  Numerous collectives of people—ethnic groups, religious 
groups, even professional associations—are united by shared cultural features (myths, 
values, etc.), but what makes a nation unique is the combination of shared culture and the 
belief in the right to territorial self determination.48 
Before 1947, there was no Pakistani state, but there was also no Pakistani nation.  
What did exist in the region at the time were four dominant ethnic groups that—based on 
the definition provided above—each represented its own nation:  the Baluch, Sindhis, 
Punjabis and Pashtuns.  Much like the Baluch, the other “nations” of Pakistan all possess 
attributes—unique language, culture, customs, traditions etc.—that differentiate them as 
individual entities.  The intent here is not to discuss whether or not Pakistan’s four 
dominant ethnic groups truly represent nations, but only to highlight the fact that the 
major common theme among them, and the primary basis for the partition of British India 
and the creation of the independent state of Pakistan, was religion—Islam.  Yet the 
creation of a state based primarily on a unitary Islamic identity has proved to be a concept 
riddled with problems—and Pakistan’s turbulent history is testament to that fact.49   
Another term critical to the understanding of Baluch nationalism is nation-state.  
The general concept suggests that a nation-state exists when the boundaries of the state 
are approximately coterminous with those of a nation—in other words the existence of a 
nation, plus political sovereignty.50  In most developed countries national identity 
evolved prior to the formulation and solidification of the structures of political authority.  
The result of this process was the nation-state.  In the case of Pakistan, as well as 
numerous other underdeveloped and newly independent countries, this sequence was 
reversed.  As scholars Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe note, the case among states in 
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Asia and Africa, unlike those in Europe, has been that “authority and sovereignty have 
run ahead of self conscious national identity and cultural integration.”51  The result has 
been the emergence not of nation-states, but of “state-nations.”  That is not to say that 
nation-states are confined to Europe, nor that the “state-nation” is purely a “Third World” 
phenomenon.  France, for instance, was a monarchical state long before the French nation 
became the Raison d’Etre, and examples of nation-states outside of Europe include Iran 
and Turkey, both of which had a history as a nation long before developing a 
corresponding state structure.    
But there is a difference between a chronological sequence in which the state was 
established before the nation, as was the case in France, and those instances where the 
state plays an active role in creating a nation—as was the case in Pakistan.  As Rejai and 
Enloe have pointed out, states actively involved in nation creating are often the product 
of decolonization.  Using a metaphor, Rejai and Enloe explain: 
The condition of the state in a postcolonial country is roughly analogous to 
a castle—a repository of rules and orders—which in the past had 
dominated a territory without actually resting upon it, held up instead by 
stilts representing coercive superiority, technological and organizational 
innovation, and indigenous deference.  The end of colonial rule either 
weakened or cut through these supporting stilts, leaving the castle 
precariously hovering above the ground.  The task of the castle’s new 
occupants is to construct a first story or, better, a basement to the castle.  
Nationalism is the material most commonly employed in this post-
independence construction.52  
This was certainly the case in Pakistan where the “homeland for Muslims” in 
South Asia that was created in 1947 was a disparate composite of numerous ethnicities, 
cultures, languages and belief systems, with no “basement” of nationalism upon which to 
build.  As a result, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and his subsequent successors, faced the 
daunting task of creating Pakistani nationalism from scratch.   
But what exactly is nationalism?  The simplest definition of nationalism is “a 
belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already 
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do.”53  Other definitions differ primarily with respect to whether nationalism is viewed as 
an “idea” or as a “process.”  One camp believes nationalism to be an idea based on such 
concepts as the nation-state, self determination, national identity, and national superiority.  
Subscribers to this vision, such as Michael Roskin and Nicholas Berry, define 
nationalism as an “exaggerated sense of the greatness and unity of one’s people.”54  
Those who view nationalism as a process define it more in terms of the unifying features 
of a nation—the political expression of a nation’s aspirations for control over a territory 
they perceive as their rightful homeland.55  Lowell W. Barrington provides a definition 
which combines these two visions of nationalism (and provides the basic definition that 
will be utilized throughout this thesis):  “the pursuit—through argument or other 
activity—of a set of rights for the self-defined members of the nation, including, at a 
minimum, territorial autonomy or sovereignty.”56  While territorial autonomy and/or 
complete sovereignty has been an objective among Baluch “nationalists” for centuries, it 
was the events in the wake of the withdrawal of the British in 1947 that ignited the sense 
of Baluch nationalism that continues to burn today.   
C. THE BIRTH OF PAKISTAN 
The partition of British India was a cataclysmic event for South Asia.  Not only 
did it result in the upheaval of Muslims and Hindus alike as millions left their ancestral 
homes and villages in order to migrate to their newly created “homeland,” but it ignited a 
spate of sectarian violence that left over a million people dead.  While Baluchistan’s 
remote location and relative religious homogeneity limited the impact of sectarian 
violence on the region, and despite the fact that Pakistan’s first Governor-General, 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, personally oversaw the administration of Baluchistan 
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immediately following Pakistani independence, the assertion of central government 
authority in Baluchistan ignited latent but lingering nationalistic feelings among the 
Baluch people that exacerbated the strains of establishing central government authority.   
The first Baluch reaction to the assertions of the central government came in late 
May of 1948, when, following the arrest of the Khan of Kalat and the invasion of 
Baluchistan by Pakistani forces, the Khan’s brother, Prince Abdul Karim, launched a 
revolt against the Pakistani army in the Jhalawan district in an effort to establish 
Baluchistan as an independent state.  The Khan, threatened with reprisals and guaranteed 
that his brother and his men would be granted safe passage and amnesty from the 
Pakistan army, persuaded Karim to surrender.  Despite these assurances—perceived or 
otherwise—the prince and over one hundred of his men were arrested and imprisoned by 
Pakistani forces.   This event led to a widespread belief among nationalists that Pakistan 
had betrayed the Baluch, and Karim has since become a rallying symbol for the Baluch 
liberation movement.  Additionally, this incident is regarded as the first in a series of 
“broken treaties” that has created distrust between the Baluch and Islamabad.57 
D. THE ONE UNIT POLICY 
The task of nation-building in Pakistan was made difficult by several factors.  
First and foremost, Pakistan, like many post-colonial states, was forced to unnaturally 
compress the process of state formation.  Unlike its Western counterparts who were able 
to establish stable nation-states only after going through long periods of “wars, bloody 
nationalist revolutions and colonialization,” Pakistan was granted its independence from 
Britain relatively peacefully—but also very rapidly.  According to scholars sympathetic 
to the Baluch and other minority causes, the process of state formation in Pakistan was 
made even more difficult by the unwillingness—often combined with the inability—of 
the Punjabi dominated central government to accommodate the legitimate aspirations of 
minority groups.58  According to this rationale, the demands of the Baluch—which 
included preserving a distinct way of life, securing autonomy, etc.—were perceived by 
the Pakistani government as a threat to their centralized power.  Their response to that 
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perceived threat has often been the use of coercive power, and the counter response by 
the Baluch has been ethnic unrest and violence. 
In an attempt to bridge the ethnic divide between the various ethnic groups within 
Pakistan and to promote a national identity the central government attempted to solidify 
the state by abolishing any semblance of regional identities.  This was the policy known 
as One Unit.  Instituted in 1955, the One Unit policy constituted the creation of a single 
provincial entity that subsumed all the administrative units of West Pakistan—to include 
the princely states.  Yet the One Unit policy failed to establish a Pakistani identity 
amongst its disparate minorities and, additionally, brought very little development to 
Baluchistan.  The lack of development, which exacerbated Baluch discontent with the 
central government, was the result of three factors:  the ongoing separatist movement in 
Baluchistan, which made the central government reluctant to undertake any development 
projects; the lack of provincial representation under the rule of Ayub Khan; and the 
traditional sardari system entrenched in Baluchistan, which provided little encouragement 
for development projects within the province.59   
While the One Unit policy was initially accepted by the Khan of Kalat, the 
failures of this policy galvanized the nationalist movement in Baluchistan and began to 
unite several different political parties under a single umbrella known as the National 
Awami Party (NAP).  The NAP was created when two major nationalist parties, the 
Pakistan National Party (PNP) and the East Pakistan-based Awami League, joined forces 
in pursuit of their primary objective:  the formation of four ethnically defined provinces.  
Other objectives of the NAP included free elections, land reform, nationalization of 
industry, and an end to Pakistan’s association with western alliances.   
Within Baluchistan, as the ethno-nationalist movement of the Baluch began to 
grow, the Khan of Kalat abandoned his support for the One Unit policy and began an 
effort to garner support for the reestablishment of an independent state of Kalat.  His 
efforts led to yet another invasion of Baluchistan by Pakistani forces and to the Khan’s 
arrest and imprisonment in 1959.  This sparked yet another revolt within Baluchistan, this 
time led by Nauroz Kahn, the Sardar of the Zarakzai tribe of the Kalat region.  Nauroz 
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Kahn and his five hundred armed men conducted an insurgent effort against the Pakistani 
government that took the army over a year to suppress.  According to Baluch nationalists, 
Nauroz Khan agreed to lay down his arms only in return for the withdrawal of the One 
Unit plan, and the guarantee of safe conduct and amnesty for his men—yet once again, 
the army dishonored its pledge.  Nauroz Khan was arrested, and five of his men were 
hanged in July 1960 on charges of treason.  Nauroz Khan himself died in Kholu prison in 
1964, becoming one of the first martyrs of the Baluch nationalist movement and he 
continues to represent—in the eyes of many Baluch—a symbol of the deceit of the 
Pakistani government.   
E. BASIC DEMOCRACIES 
The Kahn of Kalat’s reversal on the One Unit Policy coincided with the 
imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan and, shortly thereafter, the assumption of power of 
General Ayub Khan.  In an effort to increase the influence of the central government in 
West Pakistan, Field Marshal Khan instituted a policy known as Basic Democracies.60  
This five-tiered political structure instituted government councils at the local, municipal, 
district and divisional level that composed of both elected and appointed officials.  Many 
Baluch nationalists, however, viewed the appointed council members as representative of 
the central government’s encroachment on the political autonomy of the local and 
regional governments.   
Basic Democracies was instituted in 1962—the same year that Ayub Kahn’s 
government introduced a new constitution, held nationwide elections and allowed for the 
reemergence of political parties.  The introduction of Basic Democracies also coincided 
with the build-up of military cantonments within Baluchistan—a move viewed with great 
suspicion by Baluch nationalists.  The ’62 election brought several Baluch Sardars—
Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ataullah Mengal, and Ahmad Nawaz Bugti—to elected office for 
the first time.61  The central government of Pakistan, however, viewed the election of 
these staunch nationalists as a threat to Basic Democracies’ goal of minimizing the 
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influence of the tribal system.  As a result, the elected Baluch leaders were promptly 
replaced by new Sardars appointed by Islamabad.  This event sparked yet another spate 
of violence that resulted in the murder of the newly appointed Sardars and a wave of 
attacks on the Pakistani military by Baluch tribesmen.   
Much of the violence of 1962 was carried out by Parari, a guerrilla force led by 
Sher Muhammad Marri, a Marxist-Leninist who was the founder of the Baluch 
nationalist party Dem Rowak Ulus.  Parari—which is the Baluch word used to describe a 
person or persons whose grievances cannot be solved through talk—had established 
twenty two base camps throughout Baluchistan by 1963, each manned with two hundred 
full time fighters and possessing the ability to call on thousands of tribal reserves.62  
Utilizing similar tactics to those used in the revolt of 1948, Parari fighters ambushed 
convoys, bombed trains, and raided military encampments.  The central government 
responded with stiff military reprisals that included air attacks on rebel strongholds and 
the bull-dozing of several tribal leaders’ vast agricultural fields.   
Although Parari grew in significance and military might throughout the 1960s, the 
dominant player in the Baluch nationalist movement opposing the government of Ayub 
Khan continued to be the NAP.63  In Baluchistan, as in the rest of the country, the NAP 
consisted not only of politicians, but students, workers, and professionals who 
increasingly viewed the central government’s policies as promoting political and 
economic inequality, and failing to provide adequate education and medical services to 
the general populace.  The primary objectives of the NAP after 1964 were to have Basic 
Democracies replaced by direct elections; the dissolution of One Unit; and full regional 
autonomy that left only defense, foreign affairs and currency in the hands of the central 
government.   
Ultimately, the opposition of the One Unit policy led by the NAP, as well as the 
pressure exerted on the central government by the militant activities of Parari, became too 
great and the policy was abolished.  This policy shift came in 1970 shortly after Yahya 
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Khan—who succeeded Ayub Khan in 1969—induced the Pararis to agree to a cease fire 
by agreeing to redraw provincial boundaries and allow nationwide elections.  In 1970, the 
nationwide election brought to power a NAP-led provincial government in Baluchistan 
that consisted of Sardars Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri as the chief 
administrator and chairman of NAP respectively, and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, known as Bab-
i-Baluchistan (Father of Baluchistan), as governor.  The 1970 election would also bring 
to power the Awami League in East Pakistan—an event that would eventually lead to the 
suspension of all political activity, civil war and the independence of Bangladesh.  Yet it 
would be the dismissal of the NAP-led Baluchistan provincial government by Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto in 1973 that would lead to the bloody Baluch insurgency that would consume 
the province for four years. 
F. THE INSURGENCY:  1973–1977     
The insurgency that plagued the Pakistani government from 1973 to 1977 began 
with the dismissal, and imprisonment, of the Baluch provincial government and the 
banning of the ruling NAP.  It was the contention of Pakistani president Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto that the Baluch leaders were conspiring with the Soviet Union and Iraq to 
dismember Pakistan and Iran.64  It is unlikely, however, that Bhutto foresaw that his 
actions would spawn a rebellion that at its peak numbered well over 55,000 Baluch 
fighters and would take over four years to put down.65  But the sacking and imprisonment 
of the Baluch provincial government was only the precipitating event of the 1973-1977 
insurgency and the revolt was more than just a militant response to the arbitrary use of 
power by the central government.    
Many of the underlying causes of the 1973 revolt were socio-economic.  The per 
capita income in 1973 was the lowest of all of the provinces in Pakistan.66  Despite huge 
reserves of natural gas, valuable mineral deposits, and untapped fisheries off their coasts, 
Baluchistan remained grossly underdeveloped.  What development projects the central 
government had implemented in the decades after independence were viewed as 
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disproportionately favoring outsiders.  The cumulative effect of these conditions was the 
creation of a dominant view among Baluch that Baluchistan was being “colonized” by 
the Punjabis who dominated the central government.  The 1973 election of the first 
legitimate Baluch provincial government was met with high hopes for economic 
development within the impoverished province, but those hopes were dashed by the 
actions of the Bhutto regime.  What followed was a bloody revolt that would cause 
thousands of deaths and solidify Baluch hatred of their “Punjabi colonizers.”  
The revolt of 1973 had little central leadership and consisted of numerous factions 
organized primarily along tribal lines.  But the Baluch militants were uniform in their 
adherence to their code of Ryvaj and the belief that the actions of Bhutto and the central 
government was a deliberate insult to all Baluch that needed to be redressed militarily.67  
While some radical elements called for the unification of all Baluch people in Iran, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the dominant goals of the insurgency were the release of NAP 
prisoners; the restoration of the NAP government; greater political autonomy for the 
province of Baluchistan; more effective local government; and a greater share of the 
resources of the state.  The desired end state for many nationalists was a confederation of 
states within Pakistan in which the central government would be responsible for defense, 
foreign affairs, communications, and currency, while local authorities would be left in 
charge of everything else—including the exploitation of natural resources and the 
allocation of development funds.68   
During the four year insurgency, there were one hundred seventy eight major 
engagements and one hundred sixty seven lesser incidents between Pakistani forces and 
Baluch militants.  The Baluch militants avoided direct confrontation with the Pakistani 
army and whenever possible, the primary tactic of the insurgency remained ambushing 
army convoys and harassing its supply lines.  At the height of the war, there were over 
80,000 Pakistani troops in the province and by July of 1974, Baluch guerillas succeeded 
in cutting off most of the main roads into Baluchistan and blocking coal shipments from 
                                                 
67 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow:  Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, 37. 
68 Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan” in Ethnicity, ed. John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1996), 298. 
37 
Baluchistan to Punjab.69  At the heart of the Baluch resistance was Parari.  Despite 
having agreed to the cease fire with the government of Yahya Khan, many members, 
fearing that future confrontation with the central government was unavoidable, went 
underground and continued to train, garner equipment and organize resistance.     
During the years of violence after 1973, the Parari resistance slowly evolved into 
a well-established movement and became known as the Baluch People’s Liberation Front 
(BPLF).  But despite its more centralized leadership, and some courageous fighting in 
several major engagements with Pakistani forces, the leaders of the Parari resistance 
came to the conclusion that the only way to keep their movement alive was to abandon 
their camps in Baluchistan and operate from sanctuaries in southern Afghanistan.  The 
role of Afghanistan is more specifically addressed below but the encampments provided 
by the Mahammed Daoud regime provided the Baluch resistance with secure base camps 
from which to plan operations, launch attacks, and rest and refit their fighters.      
The army crackdown on the Baluch insurgency was led by General Tikka Khan—
who was castigated as the “Butcher of Baluchistan” by anti-government leaders for his 
role in putting down the Parari resistance.70  Pakistan’s counter-insurgency efforts, 
reflecting many of the same techniques utilized by the British, included organizing levies 
among the tribes; holding tribal leaders accountable for the actions of their men; and 
resettling large portions of the civilian population.  The most significant tactic against 
Baluch militants, however, proved to be the use of helicopter gun ships.  In mid-1974, the 
Pakistani government was provided with thirty U.S.-supplied Huey Cobra helicopters 
from Iran.71  These gun ships, many of which were piloted by Iranian pilots, allowed the 
Pakistani forces to use the helicopter’s maneuverability and immense firepower to “herd” 
tribesmen out of their previously secure mountain redoubts into ever-shrinking areas of 
sanctuary.   
In September of 1974, helicopter gun ships were combined with F-86 and Mirage 
fighter jets, as well as Pakistani ground forces, in a pitched battle with 15,000 Marri 
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tribesmen—led by Parari guerillas—who had gathered in the Chamalang Valley.  The 
battle, dubbed Operation Chamalang by the Pakistani Army, raged for three days.  While 
most of the Parari units and their commanders evaded capture, official accounts of the 
battle claim that 125 guerillas were killed and 900 captured.  Additionally, at least 50,000 
sheep and 550 camels were captured and sold-off to non-Baluch.72  The Baluch 
insurgency continued for several years after the battle in Chamalang Valley but the 
resistance was clearly weakened and the fighting that ensued was increasingly 
uncoordinated.  By 1977, popular support for the resistance began to ebb and an 
opportunity was presented to General Zia ul-Haq to bring the violence in Baluchistan to 
an end. 
G. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ’73 REVOLT 
Soon after General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in a bloodless coup in July of 1977, 
he freed the leadership of the by then defunct NAP and reached an uneasy truce that 
quelled the violence and effectively ended the insurgency in Baluchistan.  Yet despite 
granting several concessions to the Baluch that included the release of over 6,000 
prisoners held in Pakistani prisons, and granting amnesty to guerillas who had fled to 
Afghanistan, Zia refused any substantial concessions relating to Baluch autonomy.73  
While this successfully ended the insurgency, the four year revolt had politicized the 
populace, ingrained it with feelings of bitterness and enduring hatred, and instilled in the 
Baluch “feelings of unprecedented resentment and widespread hunger for a chance to 
vindicate their martial honor.”74  But why did the insurgency fail to achieve its goals? 
Much like Bengali discontent that led to their successful drive towards 
independence in 1971, Baluch disgruntlement in the 1970s was driven by economic as 
well as political grievances.  But the Bengalis were relatively homogenous, had a 
significant middle class, a well-established cultural and literary life, a standardized 
language, a broad base of nationalist activists, and a history of mass politicization that 
dated back to the struggle against the British Raj.75  The Baluch nationalist movement on 
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the other hand, was built on the “uncertain social and cultural foundations of a 
fragmented tribal society” that had only a miniscule middle class, widespread illiteracy, 
underdeveloped literature, only a narrow base of nationalist activists, and no real history 
of mass participation in the political process.76  Additionally, unlike the Bengalis who 
were able to gain the support of India, the Baluch lacked a foreign mentor and, as a result, 
were never able to pose a legitimate threat to the central government’s hold on power.   
H. AFGHANISTAN AND THE BALUCH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
While the 1973-1977 Baluch revolt eventually came to an end, Afghanistan 
played a pivotal role in keeping it alive for over four years.  Throughout the 1960s, both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan maintained that each country was supporting sabotage across 
the Durand Line.77  Since 1947, the Durand Line had become a primary source of tension 
between the two nations as the lack of precision in the agreement between the Brits and 
the Afghans over the demarcation of the border—as well as the Afghanis argument that 
the agreement was signed under duress—provided Afghanistan with an opening to 
challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line and further their call for an independent 
Pashtunistan.78  Continued accusations of sabotage and rising tensions between the two 
nations resulted in the breaking of diplomatic ties and led Pakistan to seal its border but 
during the 1970s Baluch insurgency, Afghanistan opened its borders to rebel fighters and 
provide them with arms and base camps from which to operate.  This created “strategic 
depth” for the insurgent effort that they would otherwise not have had.   
Additionally, the confrontation between Pakistani forces and Baluch militants led 
to the massive migration of Marri tribesman seeking refuge in Afghanistan.  While the 
majority of the 7000 Baluch refugees who fled to Afghanistan were women and children, 
many were young men.  Although removed from the violence in their homeland, many of 
these young men spent their formative years in Afghanistan learning about weapons and 
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military tactics and returned to Baluchistan in the 1990s with an increased sense of 
militancy that has been evident in the current spate of violence.79   
Just as the 1970s insurgency sent thousands of refugees into Afghanistan, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created a huge population explosion in 
Baluchistan as Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara refugees flooded Pakistan’s border area.  The 
effect of this migration on Baluchistan was immense.  Not only did the population of the 
area explode (from just over 85,000 in 1941 to over four million by 1981), but the influx 
of Afghan refugees led to cross tribal marriages that began to loosen the homogeneity of 
the Baluch region.80  But the most influential thing the Afghan refugees brought with 
them to Baluchistan was the “Kalashnikov culture.”  While the Baluch tribesman had a 
long history of martial prowess, they were most familiar with traditional warfare and low 
intensity conflict.  Many of the Afghan fighters crossing the border into Baluchistan 
during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan brought with them, and imparted on the 
local men, their knowledge of modern and heavy weapons such as mortars, rocket 
launchers, etc.  The result of the Afghan influence was a Baluch people that became more 
militant and warlike than at any other period of time.  While this militancy remained 
relatively dormant throughout the eighties and nineties, it has surfaced once again in 
recent years and threatens to push Pakistan to the brink of civil war.   
I. GENERAL ZIA AND THE “VELVET GLOVE” 
Despite the recent surge of violence in Baluchistan, it should be made clear that 
the ruling regimes of Pakistan did take significant steps, both before and after the ’73 
revolt, to improve the economic development of the province.  During the Zia regime, the 
central government implemented a $1.97 billion Special Development Plan which 
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education funds had vastly increased the paltry number of schools that existed in 
Baluchistan and increased the number of students enrolled from several thousand in 1949 
to over 1.6 million.82   
While the central government would point to the fact that the per capita funding 
for Baluchistan was higher during this period than any other provinces within Pakistan, 
many Baluch nationalist argued that Islamabad’s efforts were self serving and exploitive.  
As evidence, Baluch leaders would point to examples such as the Sui gas fields—
discovered in 1953 with an estimated 9 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves—where 
Baluch royalties only amounted to 12.5% of the well head price opposed to provincial 
royalties within other resource rich countries such as Canada where royalties equated to 
45%.83  Other grievances included the fact that both the civil service and the military—
which had an increasing presence in the province—were dominated by Punjabis.84    
In addition to Zia’s economic development plans, his “velvet glove” policy 
towards Baluchistan called for a lower profile for the Army while simultaneously 
steadfastly rejecting any calls for their removal.  Additionally, Zia refused to be baited 
into confrontation with Baluch leaders despite their inflammatory rhetoric towards his 
regime.  As a result, the insurgency that came to an end in 1977 faded into history.   
J. CONCLUSION 
The withdrawal of British from South Asia in 1947 left Pakistan’s central 
government with the daunting task of creating not only a state, but a nation, from scratch.  
Unfortunately, their attempts to create a Pakistani national identity and to solidify the 
central government’s authority—including such policies as “One Unit” and “Basic 
Democracies”—resulted in heightened discontent and feelings of alienation among many 
Baluch nationalists that culminated in the 1973 insurgency.  The Baluch nationalist 
movement seemingly disappeared in the 1980s and 1990s as successive regimes 
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following General Zia’s continued his policy of “non-provocative firmness” in which 
Baluch nationalists were placated, but not conceded to.85  While this policy curbed 
violence, the failure to address the root grievances of the Baluch people, and the lingering 
memory of what was perceived as the “wanton use of firepower” by the Pakistani army 
during the 1973 revolt, politicized much of the Baluch populace and ingrained in it a 
bitter and enduring hatred for the ruling powers in Islamabad.  There were few 
manifestations of this hatred during the two decades that followed the Zia regime—in 
part do to the continuation of the of “non-provocative firmness” policy—but the strategic 
relevance of Baluchistan has increased dramatically in the past several years.  Most 
recently, this fact has compelled the regime of President General Pervez Musharraf to 
once again attempt to exert the authority of the central government in Pakistan’s 
southwestern province.  The result has been escalating violence that could push Pakistan 
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IV. CRISIS IN BALUCHISTAN:  APPROACHING THE 
PRECIPICE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2005, the alleged gang-rape of a 32 year-old female doctor in 
Pakistan’s Baluchistan province set off a wave of attacks on the country’s largest natural 
gas field that disrupted supplies to half the population.86  While these attacks were 
viewed initially as a violent response to the rape—an event many Baluch tribesmen 
viewed as a breach of their tribal honor—the incident ignited a dormant but historically 
volatile Baluch nationalist movement that has remained hostile towards the central 
government since the creation of Pakistan.  During 2005, attacks on Baluchistan’s 
valuable natural gas infrastructure, as well as military installations throughout the 
province, numbered in the hundreds.  After separate attacks on President Pervez 
Musharraf and the commander of the province’s paramilitary force during visits to 
Baluchistan in December, the central government responded with overwhelming force.  
In spite of claims by the central government that the current “Baluchistan issue” is little 
more than a “law and order situation,”87 the central government’s response to the 
escalating violence—which has included the introduction of 36,000 government forces 
and the alleged use of attack aircraft88—indicates that the “situation” in Baluchistan 
could be approaching civil war.   
On four separate occasions since the partition of British India, Baluch nationalists 
have launched armed insurrections against the central government (the most recent and 
most costly ended in 1977) yet the province has been relatively peaceful for the past three 
decades.  Why after nearly thirty years of peaceful coexistence are Baluch nationalists 
once again clashing violently with the central government?  Violence in Baluchistan 
historically has been a product of the same “bloody competition” over territory, ethnic 
group security, political power, and natural resources that has sparked internal conflicts 
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throughout the globe.89  This chapter, however, argues that the current crisis in 
Baluchistan is also a product of more recent factors—the development of a deep-sea port 
in the Baluch city of Gwadar, the impact of the Global War on Terror, and the current 
regional dynamics in South Asia—that have increased the strategic importance of 
Baluchistan and changed the dynamic between the central government and its 
southeastern province.  This changed dynamic has exacerbated tensions and ultimately 
led to the current violent clash between ethnic Baluch tribesmen and the Pakistani 
government.  
Baluch nationalists and the central government view the current situation in 
Baluchistan very differently.  Baluch nationalists argue that the current crisis in 
Baluchistan is a violent reaction to the neglect of the Baluch populace and the 
exploitation of their natural resources by Punjabi “colonialists” from Islamabad.  The 
central government argues that the Baluch people are being “led by the nose” by a small 
number of tribal Sardars who are simply trying to maintain their iron-clad grip on power 
by derailing the central government’s effort to modernize and develop Baluchistan.  
Which argument is correct?  The simple answer is both.  A more nuanced answer is that 
the current conflict in Baluchistan is the product of several factors:  the inherent strife 
created from the collision of modernity and a traditional tribal society; power politics of 
local and national elites; and the “radicalization” of several tribes based on notions of 
deprivation and exploitation (both real and perceived).   
To provide evidence in support of this assertion, this chapter first examines the 
main issues that remain in dispute between the Baluch and the central government in 
order to determine their impact on the current crisis.  Second, this chapter analyzes the 
ethnic dimension of the conflict in order to identify how and why Baluch tribesmen have 
been mobilized to take up arms against their central government.  Finally, this chapter 
examines the various factors which have increased the strategic significance of 
Baluchistan—the Global War on Terror, the deep-sea port in Gwadar, and the regional 
dynamics of Southwest Asia—in order to highlight how these events have led to a change 
in policy and the exacerbation of existing tensions.   
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B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Much like the Baluch revolts of the past, one of the central issues of dispute in 
today’s crisis in Baluchistan is the allocation of natural resources.  In the first Baluch 
insurrection in 1947 the natural resource in dispute was arable land, which many Baluch 
viewed as being parceled off to Punjabi bureaucrats and businessmen.90  Today, the 
primary natural resource in dispute is natural gas—more specifically inequities in 
distribution and royalties—yet other perennial grievances include the historical lack of 
development in the province; the exclusion of provincial authorities and the local 
population from decisions affecting Baluchistan; and the domination of the civil service, 
police and military forces by ethnic Punjabis, and the persistent and growing presence of 
military cantonments throughout the province.  The central theme of all of these 
grievances is the feeling among many Baluch that since the creation of Pakistan, 
Baluchistan has been increasingly “colonized” by the ethnically dominant Punjabis who 
control the central government.  Yet these grievances have been exacerbated more 
recently by massive development projects within the province—which the central 
government argues are crucial to the country’s economic success and security—such as 
the major deepwater port in the coastal city of Gwadar.  Gwadar has surfaced as major 
point of contention between Baluch nationalist and the central government due to the 
Baluch belief that jobs, and ultimately royalties, created by theses projects will be 
parceled out to Punjabis from Islamabad.   
Frederic Grare argues that the restive situation in Baluchistan is fueled by three 
fundamental issues: expropriation, marginalization, and dispossession.91  Expropriation 
speaks to the belief amongst Baluch that they continue to be exploited for their vast 
natural resources (19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 6 trillion barrels of oil 
reserves92) by the Punjabi dominated central government.  This argument holds that 
while Baluchistan supplies the rest of Pakistan with 36 percent of its natural gas and 40 
percent of its total primary energy (natural gas, coal and electricity), much of Baluchistan 
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lacks access to any energy source.93  Additionally, the Baluch argue that the government 
of Pakistan pays lower price for gas produced in Baluchistan than it does for gas 
produced in Sind and Punjab.  A unit of gas in Baluchistan costs twenty-seven rupees 
compared to 170 and 190 rupees respectively in Sind and Punjab.94  This issue of 
resource allocation is central to the dispute.  In the view of the central government, 
Baluchistan’s vast resource reserves are “national property.”  Many Baluch, on the other 
hand, demand the province’s resources should first and foremost—if not exclusively—
benefit the Baluch people.  To Punjabis, who make up fifty-eight percent of the 
population, the argument that a Baluch minority of less than four percent should seek 
proprietary claims over Baluchistan, which represents forty-two percent of the land area 
of the country, is simply infuriating.95  
Grare’s concept of marginalization references the widespread belief among 
Baluch that the “mega-development” projects underway in Baluchistan, such as the 
construction of the Gwadar port, are primarily being developed by, and for the benefit, of 
non-Baluch.  As evidence, Grare cites the fact that only one in six laborers employed in 
the construction of Gwadar are Baluch, and that the only road built to open the port to the 
rest of the country is to Karachi, in Sind not Baluchistan province.  Additionally, a fear 
exists among the Baluch surrounding Gwadar that the expected population explosion (to 
nearly 2 million) associated with the port will consist primarily of Punjabis and Sindhis—
reducing the indigenous 70,000 Gwadar Baluch to an almost insignificant minority.   
The central government, on the other hand, accuses Baluch tribal leaders who 
oppose such projects of fomenting discontent and keeping Baluchistan “backwards” in 
order to maintain the traditional sardari system from which they draw their vast power.  
The central government labels the violence in Baluchistan as the work of a small band of 
“miscreants” who do not represent the majority of the Baluch population and whose 
efforts to undermine the development of Baluchistan through violence are merely a “law 
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and order situation” that will not halt progress in the province. 96  President Musharraf 
has made it abundantly clear that he will not allow the burgeoning Baluch insurgency to 
derail his efforts to modernize Baluchistan and he has continually highlighted his 
regime’s efforts to foster national cohesion.  According to Musharraf, the central 
government has allocated “unprecedented resources” to allay the “sense of deprivation” 
that pervades the historically depressed province. 97  Additionally, his government has 
implemented policies that mandate greater participation of ethnic Baluch in the military 
and civil service.98   
Musharraf believes that the unrest in Baluchistan is the product of a handful of 
tribal chiefs who have created unrest and fueled discontent “while an overwhelming 
majority of the Baluch people are patriotic Pakistanis (who) want to see their province 
progress and prosper.”99  Yet despite the central government’s efforts, the combination of 
the influx of “foreign” workers and an increase in military cantonments in three of the 
most sensitive areas of Baluchistan—Sui, with its gas-producing installations; Gwadar, 
with its port, and Kohlu, the home of most of the nationalist hard liners—have created a 
feeling among Baluch that they are gradually being dispossessed from their homeland, 
and that their unique ethnic identity is in danger of being eradicated.  But how significant 
is this notion of ethnic eradication?  Beyond the obvious fact that the Baluchistan crisis 
pits ethnic Baluch tribesmen against a central government (and military) composed 
predominantly of ethnic Punjabis, how salient is ethnicity in this conflict?    While these 
questions are difficult to answer with any clarity, an analysis of several theories on 
ethnicity—as they apply to Baluchistan—helps in the formulation of a hypothesis. 
C. ETHNICITY, POWER AND POLITICS 
Is the current violence in Baluchistan an ethnic conflict?  According to Rajshree 
Jetly an ethnic conflict is one which involves a government, and “one or more politically 
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mobilized ethnic groups who challenge the sanctity of existing political structures in their 
bid for autonomy or secession.” 100  As has been detailed in the previous chapter, the 
target of Baluch nationalist’s discontent since 1947 has been the Punjabi dominated 
central government, and their central objective has been autonomy, if not outright 
independence from the state of Pakistan.  This desire for Baluch autonomy and/or 
independence has been in large part based on the historic grievances discussed above, yet 
as Walker Connor has stated, “men don’t allow themselves to be killed for their interests; 
they allow themselves to be killed for their passions.”101  The passions that have driven 
local tribesmen to violence in Baluchistan cannot be fully understood without an 
understanding of the primordial aspects of the Baluch conflict.   
The theory of primordialism, as advocated by Clifford Geertz, holds that the 
“congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at 
times overpowering, coerciveness” which bind one to his kinsmen not merely by 
“personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at 
least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very 
tie itself.”102  Primordial ties, particularly in modernizing societies, are seen as the 
“preferred bases of demarcation of autonomous political units” from which “ancient 
hatreds” play out in violent clashes between ethnic groups.103  While few Baluch leaders 
speak directly of ancient hatred between the Baluch and the Punjabis, leaders such as 
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, often highlight the fact that the current unrest in Baluchistan 
is centered on the “national” rights of the Baluch people.104  He has warned that unless a 
concerted effort is made to safeguard Baluch interests and preserve their homeland, the 
Baluch people will remain at risk of becoming “subservient to the will of others,” and 
“slaves and third grade citizens” in their own land.105   
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As was discussed above, many Baluch—as well as Sindhis, Punjabis and 
Pashtuns—view themselves as separate nations that are incompatible with the artificially 
created concept of a Pakistani nation.  This sense of “nation” on the part of Baluch 
nationalists is based in large part on primordial ties—language, common ancestry, etc.—
that bind them together as a people and make them distinct from Punjabis who run the 
central government apparatus.  Many Baluch fighters view the clash with Pakistani forces 
as a matter of honor, and as a fight to preserve the Baluch identity from eradication at the 
hands of Punjabi colonizers.  Because of this belief, any intrusion by the central 
government, regardless of motive or objective, is an event they will fight to prevent.  As 
Brahamdagh Bugti, grandson of the Bugti chief has stated, Baluch tribesmen are fighting 
not only to demonstrate their displeasure, but to make it abundantly clear to the central 
government that they “should leave our homeland.”106    
The conflict in Baluchistan is thus centered on ethnic rights and self rule—a deep 
seated belief among many Baluch that their ethnic identity and historical physical ties to 
the land warrant that they, and no one else, should control their destiny.  But why has 
violence returned the province after nearly three decades of relative peace?  The 
primordialist viewpoint fails to explain why violence has erupted at certain times over the 
past five decades—in 1948, 1960, 1962 and 1973—while the central government and 
Baluch tribesmen have lived in peaceful coexistence during other times.  In other words, 
primordialism helps to explain the “tenacity of ethnic bonds” that have often resulted in 
political action and violence in Baluchistan, but fails to offer any “mechanism for the 
genesis of its phenomena.”107   
Furthermore, while the Baluch undoubtedly view themselves as distinct from the 
other major ethnic groups in Pakistan, there is little evidence of what could be called 
“ancient hatred” between Baluch and Punjabis.  Prior to the partition of British India, 
Baluch violence (as detailed in chapter one) was primarily directed at the British, not 
against other ethnic groups such as the Pashtuns, Punjabis or Sindhis—an indication that 
there is more to the current conflict than simply a clash of ethnic identities.  That is not to 
say that there are not primordialist aspects to the current conflict in Baluchistan, but only 
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that, as Beverly Crawford has pointed out, “cultural identities lead to conflict only when 
they have become politically charged.”108  But why have Baluch nationalists once again 
become politically charged?   
In his work Understanding Ethnic Violence, Roger D. Petersen put forth an 
emotion-based approach to ethnic conflict that highlighted four “emotions,” or 
mechanisms that trigger action to satisfy a pressing concern: fear, hatred, resentment, and 
rage.109  While each of these four have undoubtedly led to violence on particular 
occasions by certain individuals or groups, the emotion that most resonates throughout 
the Baluchistan conflict is that of resentment.   
Resentment is the perception that ones’ group is “located in an unwarranted 
subordinate position on the status hierarchy.”110  The central government of Pakistan 
historically has been dominated by ethnic Punjabis, as has many of the civil service 
positions within Baluchistan.  While the Pakistani constitution guarantees the Baluch the 
same rights as any other ethnic group111, including Punjabis, the lack of participation by 
ethnic Baluch in the federal government, military and civil service, as well as the 
arbitrary dismissal of their elected provincial government on two separate occasions by 
the ruling regime in Islamabad, has created a sense of subordination that has spawned a 
powerful and collectively held desire for equalizing of the status of Baluch vis-à-vis 
Punjabis.  Yet Petersen makes it a point to highlight that the “resentment argument” is 
about a political, not economic, sense of subordination.  In the Baluch case, economics, 
specifically the control of resources as discussed above, is central to the ongoing conflict.   
While the economic situation in Baluchistan is indeed poor, Baluch discontent is 
also as much a product of relative deprivation as it is actual economic deprivation.  The 
phenomenon of relative deprivation occurs when there exists a “discrepancy between the 
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value expectations and value capabilities of an ethnic group.”112  When this perception is 
strong enough, it can become the prime factor underlying ethnic protest and conflict.  In 
Baluchistan, this is exemplified by the situation in Gwadar where the influx of Punjabi 
workers to construct the port, and the purchase of local land by Punjabi investors, is seen 
by the Baluch population as further examples of Punjabis getting rich while the vast 
majority of Baluch remain in poverty.   
A variant of the relative deprivation theory is internal colonialism.  According to 
this theory, ethnic identity is explained in terms of the marginalization of peripheral 
groups in relation to a “core” group within a complex society.113  This theory helps 
explain the sentiment of many Baluch who feel that the Punjabi dominated central 
government supplanted British colonial rule with an internal colonialism in which Baluch 
political concerns are unceremoniously subordinated to those of the state.   
Another argument—the argument most often evoked by the central government—
is that the violence plaguing Baluchistan is a direct result of manipulation by tribal 
sardars (leaders) who are exploiting ethnicity as a means of maintaining their grip on 
power over Baluch society.  This is an argument grounded in instrumentalist theory.  
Instrumentalists generally treat ethnicity as “a social and political construction in a 
specific context in which elites manipulate cultural symbols of their ethnic groups to 
derive political and economic advantage in the quest for power and position.”114  
According to this logic ethnicity is malleable and becomes significant within a specific 
group only when “ethnic activists” or “political entrepreneurs” exploit it for their 
advantage.115  In other words, ethnicity is salient only when its exploitation provides 
strategic efficacy for certain individuals or groups.   
The central government of Pakistan maintains that the violence in Baluchistan is 
solely the work of tribal chiefs who are “anti-development and anti-democracy”116 and 
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who seek only to maintain their power under the feudal tribal system.  In a speech in 
January 2006, President Musharraf reflected this instrumentalist view of the Baluchistan 
issue:   
The tribal chiefs have held this country hostage for the past 30 to 40 years 
for their interests.  These tribal chiefs have no interest whatsoever in the 
well being and progress of the common man and subject their own sub-
tribesmen to torture because of their pro-development thinking.”117   
The central government’s argument that manipulation by Baluch tribal leaders is 
the underlying cause of the current violence has resonance.  As has been discussed 
earlier, Baluchistan traditionally has been a tribal society centered on the leadership of 
the Sardar, or tribal chief, and these individuals undoubtedly stand to lose if the sardari 
system is abolished—an underlying goal of the “modernization” projects of the central 
government.118  Yet the violent acts in Baluchistan are not carried out by these tribal 
chiefs, but their followers, and the instrumentalist approach fails to explain why so many 
Baluch tribesmen have taken up arms against the central government.  Put another way, 
why does the message of the tribal chiefs resonate with much of the Baluch population—
and motivate them to commit acts of violence—while the efforts of the central 
government are only looked upon with suspicion?   
Michael E. Brown contends that two factors are particularly important in 
answering the “why do followers follow?” question:  antagonistic group histories and 
mounting economic problems.119  The current conflict in Baluchistan is a product of both 
“political memories” of past injustices—real or perceived—inflicted on the Baluch 
people by the central government, and the depressed economic situation which is part of 
the reality of Baluchistan.  Past “betrayals” by the Pakistani government, as highlighted 
in previous chapters, include: the arrest and imprisonment of Baluch rebel leaders after 
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the revolts of 1948 and 1960 despite guarantees of amnesty and safe passage; the 
arbitrary dismissal of the democratically elected provincial government in 1973 that led 
to the four year insurgency; and the continued exploitation of the province’s natural gas 
and other natural resources.  Additionally, the heavy handed response to the current 
unrest in Baluchistan by the Pakistani military has evoked memories of the 1970s revolt 
in which the use of Iranian helicopter gun-ships and bombings by fixed wing aircraft was 
viewed as a wanton use of force.   
As a result of this “antagonistic group history,” any assurances by the central 
government that its development efforts in Baluchistan will bring prosperity to the 
historically underdeveloped province are met with great suspicion.  To put it in the words 
of Lake and Rothchild, the current crisis in Baluchistan is in part due to a “problem of 
credible commitment” in which the central government is unable to reassure the Baluch 
people that it will not renege on its promises of economic and political development.120  
Tribal leaders have used this fear of exploitation as a means to mobilize support for the 
nationalist cause and ultimately to have acts of violence committed against the central 
government.    
Each of the theories discussed above help explain the current conflict in 
Baluchistan.  Ultimately, the conflict in Baluchistan has been spurred by a combination 
of mass-based grievances over economic exploitation, political marginalization and a fear 
of ethnic eradication, that have been manipulated by tribal Sardars as tools for 
mobilization.  As is the case in many conflicts, the underlying causes of ethnic and/or 
internal violence is often a combination of factors—structural, political, economic, social, 
cultural, and perceptual.121  Elements of each of theses are present in today’s conflict in 
Baluchistan, yet these factors alone do not account for the specific timing of the most 
current spate of violence.  As Michael Brown has argued, what determines the specific 
timing of ethnic violence is the simultaneous presence of the above factors in a 
“combustible setting.”122  While it could be argued that the setting in Baluchistan has 
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been “combustible” since 1947, it has undoubtedly been made more so in recent years 
because of its increased strategic significance.   
D.  STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 
Many of the same factors which have sparked violence in Baluchistan in the past, 
socio-economic underdevelopment; political frustration; and historical grievances based 
on feelings of betrayal and exploitation by the central government remain today.  Yet the 
most significant factor contributing to the current conflict in Baluchistan is the province’s 
increased strategic significance.  Baluchistan has always been important to Pakistan 
because of its geo-strategic location and its rich energy resources, but more recent events 
such as the development of a deep-sea port in Gwadar, Pakistani support for the U.S.-led 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the ongoing regional dynamics of South Asia have 
resulted in an effort by the central government to more strongly exert its authority within 
Pakistan’s southwestern province.  This renewed interest in Baluchistan, which has 
included an influx of foreign workers and an increased military presence, has ignited the 
smoldering belief among Baluch nationalists that the central government seeks only to 
subjugate the Baluch people and exploit their resources for the benefit of the central 
government.  The result has been an increased sense of “colonialization” on the part of 
the Baluch population that has spawned a violent backlash by Baluch militants.   
Armed clashes between ethnically Baluch tribesmen and the Punjabi dominated 
Pakistani military have plagued Baluchistan since 1947.  On four separate occasions—
directly following the partition of British India in 1947; twice in response to the anti-
ethnic policies of Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1960 and 1962; and after the arbitrary 
dismissal of the Baluch provincial government by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 
1973—Baluch militants took up arms in revolt against the central government.  The most 
recent and most bloody clash was brought to an end shortly after General Zia ul-Haq 
ousted President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and took power in a bloodless coup in 1977.  In an 
effort to consolidate his power and bring an end to the costly military endeavor in 
Baluchistan, Zia adopted a “velvet glove” policy in which he placated the Baluch tribal 
chief without ever conceding to their demands.  This policy of “non-provocative 
firmness” was maintained throughout Zia’s reign from 1977 to 1989, as well as during 
the alternating regimes of the “decade of democracy” from 1989 to 1999.  Yet shortly 
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after General Pervez Musharraf returned Pakistan to military rule in 1999, changes in the 
geopolitical landscape of the region prompted him to take a different tack with respect to 
Baluchistan.  The most significant event effecting the change in policy was the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001.     
1. The Global War on Terror 
In the wake of the 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., 
Pakistan was presented with a choice by the United States government:  “You are either 
100 percent with us or a 100 per cent against us.”123  In response to the ultimatum, 
President Pervez Musharraf reversed a decades old policy of support for the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and provided the United States with both logistics and intelligence in support 
of military operations to root out Al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban regime.  By late 
2001, reports that Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were slipping across the Durand Line 
into Pakistan forced Musharraf to deploy his army—in numbers unseen along the border 
since the colonial rule of the British—to the western borderlands in an attempt to seal the 
border from infiltrators.124  While most of the infiltration in the early days of the war in 
Afghanistan was concentrated along the western border of the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP), Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives were also reported operating along 
the Baluchistan border.125  Pakistani forces continue to operate in the tribal area along its 
western border, but rising unrest in Baluchistan since early 2005, as well as the 2004 
bombing in Gwadar that killed three Chinese engineers, have required an even more 
pronounced military presence within the heart of Baluchistan itself.   
While this increase presence cannot be directly linked to the January 2005 rape of 
the female doctor, the violence that ensued in the event’s aftermath points to the fact that 
frustration with the military had been growing.  The spike in violence that followed the 
doctor’s rape continued to escalate throughout the year.  According to the federal 
government’s tally, in 2005 there were more than 275 rocket attacks on government 
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installations, seventeen bombings, and eight attacks on gas pipelines.126  Another estimate, 
by the mainstream Dawn newspaper, tallied the totals for 2005 at 261 bomb blasts and 
167 rocket attacks, while Baluch militants—prominently the Baluchistan Liberation 
Army—have made claims that there were five times that many attacks.   
In December 2005, Baluch militants rocketed a meeting attended by President 
Musharraf in Kohlu, the capital of the Marri tribal area of Baluchistan.  Days later, 
tribesmen fired rockets at a helicopter carrying the commander of the para-military unit 
the Frontier Corps-Baluchistan.  By mid-December, press reports indicated that Pakistani 
military and para-military forces were engaged in “a full-scale military campaign” 
against militant Baluch tribesmen.127  Operations by the Frontier Corps during January of 
this year have resulted in the destruction of eleven “fararri” camps, or insurgent training 
camps, throughout Baluchistan, but violence against vital infrastructure and military 
outposts has continued nearly unabated.   
The increased violence in Baluchistan, particularlay on its military installations, is 
of considerable concern to Pakistan but it should also concern the United States.  In the 
wake of 9/11, President Musharraf provided several key installations from which U.S. 
forces could support Operation Enduring Freedom.  Two of these installations, air fields 
in Pasni and Dalbadin, are located in the Baluchistan province and have been used 
extensively since 2001 to provide logistical support for special forces and intelligence 
operations.  The U.S. presence in Baluchistan is primarily due to its value for operations 
in Afghanistan, but it has also been speculated that the United States remains there due to 
its value as a “jump-off point” for potential future military operations against Iran and its 
nuclear program.  Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has even gone so far as to write 
that U.S. special forces have already been inserted from secret bases in Baluchistan into 
Iran in order to prepare for a possible strike against the government in Tehran.128   
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Whether or not these reports are accurate, Baluchistan is still of considerable value to 
U.S. efforts in the region, and increased violence in the province could put these efforts in 
jeopardy.      
2. Port of Gwadar 
One of the primary targets of violence in Baluchistan has been the deep-sea port 
facility under construction in the Baluch city of Gwadar.  The development of the 
Gwadar port lies at the heart of President Musharraf’s plan for economic prosperity in 
Pakistan.  Only two hundred-fifty miles from Strait of Hormuz—through which 40 
percent of world’s oil supply flows—the Gwadar port will provide land locked Central 
Asia, Afghanistan and China’s Xinjiang Province with commercial access to the Persian 
Gulf, and has the potential to provide a windfall of transit fees for Pakistan.  Not only 
will the development of the deep-water port transform Pakistan into an economic hub of 
commercial activity among its energy rich neighbors, it will also provide “strategic 
depth” to the Pakistan Navy.  Karachi, Pakistan’s only other deep water port, is located 
450 miles closer to the border with India than Gwadar.  Karachi was blockaded during 
the war of 1971 by the Indian Navy and under threat of blockade during tensions with 
India in 1991—events Pakistan would not like to see repeated in the future.   
The Gwadar project also provides an opportunity for Pakistan to improve 
relations with regional and emerging world power China.  To date, China has provided a 
large sum of workers (450) and nearly eighty percent of the project’s funding.  For China, 
the Gwadar port will not only allow it to diversify its crude oil import routes and extend 
its presence in the Indian Ocean, but it would also allow the Chinese to more easily 
monitor U.S. naval activity in the region.  China is obviously concerned with the impact 
of violence on their sizeable investment in Gwadar.  In addition to having three Chinese 
workers killed and nine more wounded in an attack on the port in May 2004, China has 
put pressure on President Musharraf to guarantee their workers safety, and more 
importantly, to keep the port development on schedule.  President Musharraf has 
responded by increasing the number of military personnel and installations in the 
region—a chief grievance of Baluch nationalists. 
China is not the only regional power with an interest in the Gwadar port.  Yet 
unlike China, India and Iran have a reason to see the project fail, or at least be 
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temporarily delayed.  Iran is currently developing, with Indian support, its own deep 
water port in the city of Chabahar.  Much like Pakistan’s designs for Gwadar, Iran hopes 
that Chabahar will serve as Central Asia’s conduit to warm water ports and they view the 
development of the Pakistani port as a threat to their economic interests.  The common 
opposition to Gwadar by Iran, India, and the local Baluch creates much concern for 
Pakistan’s ruling elite and fuels the never ending speculation that India is supporting the 
ongoing Baluch insurgency.129  Yet President Musharraf has made it clear that the 
development of Gwadar is fundamental to the security and economic interests of Pakistan 
and its development will not be delayed by anyone or anything.   
Musharraf argues that the port of Gwadar will provide opportunity and great 
benefit not only to greater Pakistan, but specifically to the Baluch people.  Yet many 
Baluch remain skeptical and are concerned that they will be left on the sidelines as jobs 
and revenue go to outsiders—particularly Punjabis.  Baluch nationalists point to 
skyrocketing real estate prices around Gwadar—due to the increased demand created by a 
growing non-Baluch population—as well as the increase in military cantonments, and the 
influx of foreign workers, both Chinese and Punjabis, as evidence that the central 
government is not only exploiting the province for their benefit, but attempting to dilute 
the Baluch culture by going ahead with these massive development projects without 
consulting, nor considering the concerns of the indigenous population.   
An additional concern with respect to Gwadar that deeply troubles the central 
government is the potential interest of Al Qaeda.  Some, such as Frederic Grare, have 
speculated that Gwadar may present Al Qaeda with an irresistible target.  An attack on 
the port would not only “payback” Pakistan for its support of U.S. operations in 
Afghanistan, but also prevent Pakistan from capitalizing on the benefits of Gwadar—
thereby becoming a stronger, more prosperous state—a prospect Al Qaeda firmly 
rejects.130  The most dangerous threat to Gwadar, however is if fringe elements of the 
Baluch nationalist movement, who have already reeked significant havoc in Gwadar, find 
                                                 
129 Mariana Baabar, “How India is Fomenting Trouble in Pakistan via Afghanistan,” News 
International, 16 April 2006. 
130 Grare, 11. 
59 
common ground with Al Qaeda and are able to tap into the terrorist network’s vast 
resources to conduct a major attack on the port facility. 
While the mega-development project in Gwadar has had the most profound 
impact on the rising discontent among Baluch, it is only one of several major initiatives 
throughout Pakistan and Baluchistan that the central government is currently supporting.  
Other projects that effect Baluchistan include major water projects such as the Kalabagh 
Dam, major mining projects in Sandak, and a possible gas pipeline that links Iran and 
India.  This last project—an attempt by India to satisfy its skyrocketing demand for 
energy resources—reflects the growing significance of Baluchistan in the volatile 
regional dynamics of southwest Asia.   
3. Regional Dynamics  
Because of its geo-strategic location, events in Baluchistan have regional effects.  
These events are magnified in part because the two countries bordering the Baluchistan 
province, Iran and Afghanistan, both have sizeable Baluch populations of their own.  
Iran’s concerns with respect to Baluchistan are focused on two things:  a spillover of 
Baluch nationalism from Pakistan; and the subversive efforts of the U.S. that are 
referenced above.  Iran has once before put down its own Baluch insurrection, and both 
Iran and Afghanistan view any movement towards the consolidation of a “Greater 
Baluchistan”—the geographic area covering the Pakistani province of Baluchistan as well 
as a large swath of southeastern Iran and southern Afghanistan—as a threat to their 
territorial sovereignty.      
Afghanistan’s concerns—which are in large part shared by the United States—are 
centered on Baluch support of Taliban fighters along the border area between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of allowing Taliban fighters to take 
refuge across the border in Baluchistan, and has even accused it of allowing Taliban 
recruiters to comb the madrasas of Lahore and Karachi for suicide bomber “recruits.”131   
Pakistan has made numerous vociferous counter-claims that Baluch terrorists are 
being armed inside Afghanistan and dispatched across the border to commit violence and 
create havoc.  Accusations of Afghan support for Baluch rebels have been made during 
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each of the previous Baluch insurrections but the current accusations come at a time 
when the border area between the two countries, which has been historically disputed and 
a “grey area” where the tribal people who inhabit it fail to recognize its existence, has 
been a primary concern of the United States.  Reports of the local population harboring 
Taliban and Al Qaeda members, to include Osama Bin Laden, have been unending since 
2001 and the U.S. government has demonstrated growing frustration with the Musharraf 
regime for its lackluster efforts to control its rugged border area.  There is currently no 
evidence of a serious network of Taliban camps within Baluchistan, and their efforts to 
date seem to be directed back towards Afghanistan, but the mere presence of the Taliban 
in the region elevates the possibility that the burgeoning insurgency in Baluchistan could 
become “Talibanized”—a dire prospect for both Pakistan and the United States. 
Pakistan has countered vociferously claims that it is not doing all that it can 
militarily to ebb Al Qaeda and Taliban activity, but also claims that its efforts along the 
Afghan border are being subverted by the clandestine activities of its arch rival India.  In 
January 2006, India made the following official statement:   
The Indian government has been watching with concern the spiraling 
violence in Baluchistan and the heavy military actions, including 
helicopter gun ships and jet fighters by the government of Pakistan to 
quell it.  We hope the government of Pakistan will exercise restraint and 
take recourse to peaceful discussions to address the grievance of the 
people of Baluchistan.132 
India’s expressed concern was met with a swift Pakistani retort that asked India to “mind 
its business.”133   
The seemingly never ending war-of-words between the two adversaries, which 
has been predominantly focused on the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, has 
now spilled over into Baluchistan.  The crisis in Baluchistan has become an issue 
between the two states since claims began to emanate from New Delhi that the Pakistan 
army was committing human rights violations against Baluch civilians.  Not only did 
Pakistan respond with a call for India to “douse the fire of insurgency in its own 
backyard” before making such accusations, but President Musharraf openly accused the 
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Indian government of supporting the Baluch insurgency.  In February 2006, it was 
reported that Musharraf presented Afghan president Hamid Karzai with “proof” that 
India was using bases within Afghanistan to “foment trouble in Baluchistan.”134   
Pakistan Senator Mushahid Hussain took those accusations one step further in an 
April 2006 interview with the Pakistani paper The News when he accused India’s 
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of establishing training camps near the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border in order to train Baluch dissidents in the use of explosives and 
sophisticated weapons.135  Hussain further claimed that India is using their five 
diplomatic missions within Afghanistan as “launching pads for undertaking covert 
operations” in both the NWFP and Baluchistan.136  While India denies such accusations, 
the escalating war-of-words between the two foes over Baluchistan does not bode well 
for peace and stability in the region.   
E. CONCLUSION  
Many of the historical Baluch grievances that have led to violence in the past 
remain today.  Yet it is the increased strategic significance of Baluchistan—which caused 
the central government to alter its relationship with its southwestern province—that is the 
preeminent factor that led to the most recent unrest.  For nearly three decades prior to the 
outbreak of violence in 2005, the policy of “non-provocative firmness” put into place by 
General Zia ul-Haq kept the peace in Baluchistan.  Zia’s policy, established in the 
aftermath of the bloody 1973-1977 insurgency, did little to address the long list of Baluch 
grievances but it did limit the presence of the central government in the affairs of 
Baluchistan—which placated the ruling tribal leaders, and kept violence to a minimum.  
The decision to invest millions in a deep-water port in Gwadar; the events of 9/11 and the 
subsequent Global War on Terror; as well as the regional dynamics these events created, 
however, made a policy of “non-provocative firmness” towards Baluchistan no longer 
tenable.   
The increased stakes in Baluchistan required that the central government be more 
assertive in its approach to the province.  This approach included an increased military 





presence—something the Baluch fiercely oppose—but also huge increases in the amount 
of money allocated for Baluchistan’s development.  Regardless of the central 
government’s motive, these efforts have been met with suspicion and violence by the 
Baluch people due to enduring feelings of exploitation, political marginalization, and 
ethnic dispossession—feelings that Baluch tribal leadership have been able to exploit.   
While the Musharraf regime seemingly understands that the Baluch problem 
cannot be solved by military measures alone, its efforts to convince the populace of 
Baluchistan that the government’s efforts are in their best interest have fallen on deaf 
ears.  This is not solely the fault of the Musharraf government—it is also a product of 
nearly six decades of mismanagement—but unless the Pakistani president is able to build 
confidence in the minds of the average Baluch that the central government is working for 
the good of all Pakistanis, including the Baluch, and not just the ruling elite nor the ethnic 
Punjabis who dominate the government, violence in Baluchistan will only continue.   
 













Pakistan’s Baluchistan province has been home to four violent uprisings against 
the central government since 1947.  These revolts were the product of several factors:  a 
fiercely independent Baluch people that eschew outside interference; the lasting legacy of 
the techniques and policies implemented by the British during their century long rule of 
British India; mismanagement by ruling Pakistani regimes; and real and perceived 
historical grievances that have allowed Baluch leaders to mobilize support for the 
nationalist cause.  Yet the determining factor in the outbreak of violence in Baluchistan 
has been major policy decisions by the central government that changed the existing 
dynamic between the governing authority and the indigenous population.  While the 
intent of these policies, which increased the central government’s influence and physical 
presence in Baluchistan, was to centralize control and strengthen the Pakistani state, the 
ultimate result was violence, instability, and chaos.  Much like the insurrections of the 
past, the current spate of violence that has plagued Baluchistan since January 2005 is the 
result of the combination of historical grievances and a dramatic change in government 
policy.  This recent change in policy was brought about by the heightened strategic 
significance of Baluchistan that was created in large part by two significant events:  the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the development of a massive deep-water port 
in the Baluch city of Gwadar. 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze Baluch nationalist violence throughout 
history in order to disaggregate the root causes of the current unrest in the province.  
Previous chapters have examined the history of the relationship between the Baluch 
people and their central government over three distinct periods:  under British rule in the 
nineteenth century; during the first three decades of Pakistani independence; and from 
January 2005 to the present.   This examination included analysis of the Baluch as a 
people; their historic grievances; and the techniques of control utilized by both British 




B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
1. Impact of British Rule 
Violence in Baluchistan throughout the history of Pakistan has been a result of 
several factors, not the least of which a the policies of the central government.  But the 
examination of the Baluch under British rule brings to light the fact that several policies 
utilized by the British in the nineteenth century laid the groundwork for subsequent 
Pakistani policies.  After the their defeat in the First Afghan War the British abandoned 
their “Frontier of Separation” policy, which allowed for the autonomous and semi-
autonomous rule by local tribesmen along the western border of British India, and 
instituted the “Closed Border System” in which the British increased their presence 
(especially militarily) in areas under their direct control.  The closed border system 
proved to be extremely costly for the British as they were continuously forced to battle 
elusive tribesman who resisted direct foreign rule.  Solutions to controlling the restive 
border area under the closed border system included “divide and conquer” practices 
pitting one tribe against another, as well as collective responsibility techniques in which 
entire tribes would be punished for the actions of individuals.   
The closed border system ultimately failed and was abandoned for the much more 
successful “forward policy” instituted by Sir Robert Sandeman.  This policy was centered 
on the tenets of economic development, a more limited role for the military, and 
increased tribal participation in local administration.137  Unfortunately, three decades of 
the closed border system had sewn seeds of mistrust and anger towards foreign rule that 
would be exacerbated by the nascent policies of the Pakistani government after 1947.   
2. Legacy of Betrayal 
Shortly after the partition of British India in 1947 the central government of 
Pakistan moved to assert its authority over its disparate population in order to consolidate 
the newly formed state.  In 1948 the Khan of Kalat, who had ruled—under the British—
over much of the territory of present day Baluchistan, refused to concede to demands that 
Kalat become part of the Pakistani state.  His arrest and the subsequent invasion by the 
Pakistani army sparked the first of the four rebellions that have plagued modern 
Baluchistan.  This revolt, led by the Khan’s brother Abdul Karim, was ultimately 
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defeated, but the way in which the revolt was brought to an end left a lasting impression 
on the Baluch populace.  In exchange for his surrender, the Pakistani government gave 
assurances that Abdul Karim and his fighters would be given amnesty from arrest.  Yet 
shortly after the cease fire Karim and over one hundred of his men were arrested and 
imprisoned—an incident the Baluch view as the first “betrayal” by the Pakistani 
government.138   
The implementation of the One Unit policy, which attempted to create a single 
provincial entity that subsumed all the administrative units of West Pakistan, sparked the 
second Baluch revolt in 1959.  After nearly a year of fighting, the leader of the revolt 
Nauroz Kahn agreed to lay down his arms in return for the withdrawal of One Unit, and 
the guarantee of amnesty for his men.  Understanding that his terms had been accepted, 
Nauroz Khan surrendered, only to be arrested and five of his men hanged in July 1960 on 
charges of treason.  Nauroz Khan, who died in Kohlu prison in 1964, is recognized by 
Baluch as the first martyr of the Baluch nationalist movement, and as a lasting symbol of 
the deceit of the Pakistani government.   
Subsequent betrayals by the central government were centered on elections.  The 
1962 elections, directed as part of the government’s the Basic Democracies program, 
brought several ardent Baluch nationalists to power:  Sardars Khair Bakhsh Marri, 
Ataullah Mengal, and Ahmad Nawaz Bugti.  The central government, viewing the 
election of these tribal leaders as a threat to Basic Democracies’ goal of minimizing the 
influence of the tribal system, promptly replaced them with appointees of Islamabad.  
This event resulted in the murder of the Islamabad appointed Sardars and sparked yet 
another revolt.   
The Baluch revolt that raged from 1973 to 1977, like that of 1962, began with the 
dismissal of the Baluch provincial government.  It had been the contention of Pakistani 
president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that the Baluch leaders were conspiring with the Soviet 
Union and Iraq to dismember Pakistan and Iran.  Whether this was true or not, the event 
was seen by the Baluch populace as another example of the arbitrary use of power and 
the subjugation of the Baluch people.  It is this and previous betrayals that have 
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contributed to the inherent sense of distrust of the central government among Baluch that 
has allowed tribal leaders to mobilize tribesmen to subvert the central government’s 
development efforts within the province.  Ultimately, the current crisis in Baluchistan is 
in part a product of this legacy of betrayal.   
3. Failed Policies 
The state of Pakistan was created in 1947 by combining five disparate ethnic 
populations:  Sindhis, Punjabis, Pashtuns, Bengali, and Baluch.  In an effort to create 
from scratch a Pakistani “nation,” successive governments implemented policies aimed at 
bridging the ethnic divide between the various ethnic groups within the Pakistani state.  
Yet these attempts to solidify the state also attempted to abolish any semblance of 
regional identity.  The policy known as One Unit was instituted in 1955 in part to counter 
the ethnic domination of the Bengalis in Eastern Pakistan.  This policy, which ostensibly 
collapsed all four ethnic groups of Western Pakistan into one political entity, failed to 
take into account the potency of ethnicity among its minority groups and ultimately led to 
a bloody Baluch uprising. 
Basic Democracies was a program instituted by Field Marshal Ayub Khan that 
instituted a five-tiered political structure from the local to the provincial level that was 
composed of both elected and appointed officials.  Basic Democracies was billed as a 
way to not only democratize Pakistan, but also to wean the western provinces from the 
feudal tribal system that had been in place for centuries.  It was a policy that for obvious 
reasons was opposed in Baluchistan by the tribal sardars who depended on the sardari 
system for their wealth and power.  Baluch nationalists, including but not exclusively the 
tribal leadership, opposed Basic Democracies on the grounds that the Islamabad 
appointed representatives reflected the central government’s encroachment on local 
politics and provincial autonomy.  The view that Basic Democracies only represented an 
attempt to placate Baluch desires for democratic representation without actually 
providing it was vindicated shortly after the 1962 election when the elected Baluch 
leadership was replaced with individuals more attune to Islamabad by the central 
government.  As discussed above, this event ultimately led to the third Baluch revolt.    
State formation in Pakistan has been difficult and it could be argued that the 
process—nearly six decades after independence—is still far from complete.  Yet as 
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thorny as the task of creating a nation-state out of five ethnically diverse populations has 
been, this undertaking was made even more difficult by the unwillingness—often 
combined with the inability—of the Punjabi dominated central government to 
accommodate the aspirations of its multiple ethnic groups.139  In Baluchistan, this failure 
has led to four armed insurrections, and has undoubtedly contributed to the burgeoning 
violence today. 
4. Power and Ethnic Politics 
It is clear from the discussion in Chapter 2 that the Baluch are a distinct and proud 
ethnic people who view themselves as quite unique from the rest of Pakistan’s diverse 
population.  While there is little evidence that the current conflict in Baluchistan is a 
product of “ancient hatreds” between the Baluch people and the ethnic Punjabis who 
control the central government, nationalist leaders have been able to use ethnicity as a 
tool for mobilization.  They have been able to do this because of the combination of an 
“antagonistic group history,” reflected in the legacy of betrayal discussed above, as well 
as the continual lack of economic development, and a perceived sense of exploitation at 
the hands of the central government.  These factors have allowed Baluch nationalist to 
play on feelings of resentment among the Baluch populace and ultimately motivate some 
to commit violence against the state.   
This feeling of resentment among Baluch only became salient after specific 
events increased the strategic significance of Baluchistan.  These events resulted in the 
heightened presence of the central government in Baluch affairs, as well as a heightened 
sense of intrusion among the Baluch populace.  While legitimate “ancient hatred” 
between Baluch and Punjabis my be lacking, the rising sense among Baluch that the 
central government’s underlying motive in Baluchistan is the eradication of the Baluch 
identity has the potential to create a present-day hatred that could lead to violence 
directed not just at military personnel but civilian Punjabis as well.  This is a prospect 
that if realized would send an already volatile situation into utter chaos.  
5. Strategic Significance as a Catalyst  
The current crisis in Baluchistan, that began in January 2005 shortly after the 
alleged rape of a local doctor in Baluchistan by four military personnel, is at its base the 
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product of many of the same factors which sparked violent Baluch revolts on four 
separate occasions since 1947.  These factors include:  socio-economic 
underdevelopment; political frustration; and historical grievances based on Baluch 
feelings of betrayal and exploitation by the central government.  Yet the current spate of 
violence is also a direct result of Baluchistan’s heightened strategic significance.   
The development of the Gwadar deep-sea port, Pakistani support for the U.S.-led 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the ongoing regional dynamics of South Asia have 
demanded that the central government more strongly exert its authority in Baluchistan.  
In the aftermath of 9/11 President Musharraf agreed to not only offer intelligence and 
logistic support to U.S. operations in Afghanistan but also agreed to deploy large 
numbers of troops along Pakistan’s western border—an area that the central government 
previously had little influence over.  In Gwadar, the influx of foreign workers required 
for the port’s construction also coincided with an increased military presence.  The 
expanded presence of the military, and the flood of non-Baluch workers into the 
province, has exacerbated long-held feelings among Baluch nationalists that the central 
government’s ultimate goal is to make Baluchistan a colony of Punjab, and the Baluch  
people second class citizens in their own land.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In a speech in January 2006 President Musharraf correctly identified that the 
current crisis in Baluchistan is centered on two things:  the problem of national 
unity/inter-provincial harmony, and the problem of poverty alleviation/economic 
development.140  The Musharraf regime’s approach to these problems seems to be two 
pronged.  On one hand the government is pushing ahead with major development projects 
such as the Gwadar port and other projects that will bolster the economic strength of the 
Baluchistan, and Pakistan as a whole.  On the other hand, the central government is 
simultaneously attempting to crush armed Baluch militants who President Musharraf 
views as “miscreants” and terrorists hell-bent on derailing Baluchistan from its path to 
modernization and prosperity.  It is difficult to argue with Musharraf’s ardent belief that 
the “writ of law” must rein supreme if Pakistan is to ever establish itself as a strong and 
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stable state, and his government has taken significant steps to address many of the 
problems in Baluchistan, yet the failure of the current policies emanating from Islamabad 
to address all of the factors that have led to the recent surge in violence will allow those 
who are leading the current uprising to continue to mobilize support.  In other words, if 
the central government is to be successful in bringing peace and stability to Baluchistan, 
it must take a more holistic approach to the crisis.  To that end, the following 
recommendations are offered: 
1. Invest More in Human Capital  
The strategy to end violence in Baluchistan based primarily on major economic 
development projects has failed to demonstrate tangible results for the Baluch populace.  
This is in large part due to the fact that the efforts to develop Baluchistan have been far 
more focused on “things”—ports, roads, dams, etc.—than on people.  Until this focus 
shifts and the Baluch people become more directly involved, development projects will 
continue to be viewed as tools of exploitation.  This renewed emphasis on the human 
capital in Baluchistan will require a dramatic effort to educate and train Baluch workers 
so they can play a larger role in the province’s economic development.  It will also 
require a more prominent role for local leadership in the decision making process as it 
applies to development projects in Baluchistan.   
Additionally, mega-development projects focused on long term economic growth 
should also be accompanied by “micro-development” projects focused on the more 
immediate needs of the Baluch people—schools, medical clinics, and readily accessible 
water and electricity.  Ultimately, a policy a kin to Sir Robert Sandeman’s “peaceful 
penetration” of the nineteenth century which emphasizes job creation, education, and a 
reduced military presence, will help diminish Baluch discontent with the central 
government, and ultimately dry up support for the more militant elements of the Baluch 
nationalist movement.  While the Musharraf regime has taken several steps in this 
direction, more must be done. 
 2. Seek out the Moderates  
The central government has made it clear that it views the tribal leadership behind 
the unrest in Baluchistan as terrorists and it has made little attempt to initiate a dialogue 
with them.  If it is to maintain this policy, the central government must look beyond its 
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relationship with the tribal leaders and look at the broader political arena for a more 
moderate core of political leaders that it can negotiate with.  These leaders must possess 
sufficient clout to have the support of the more militant groups, and possess the capacity 
to make concessions that will move the peace process forward.  In the initial stages, this 
should include secret negotiations with Baluch leaders.  By keeping negotiations secret, 
the two groups avert the risks of open negotiations:  the perception that violence is being 
rewarded; “negotiation fatigue” by both leaders and masses due to lack of progress; and 
the possibility that those opposed to negotiations will commit further acts of violence to 
derail the process.   
3. Develop a Roadmap 
As Timothy D. Sisk points out, “sustainable termination of a civil war requires an 
intricate step-by-step process of confidence building, disarmament and security, 
transitional justice, and a forum in which the political, economic, and social terms of the 
post-war order can be defined.”141  While the crisis in Baluchistan has not yet reached the 
point of civil war, the central government would be well served to take preventive steps 
to avoid such a calamity that go beyond a military crackdown and major development 
projects.  This will require that the central government address the underlying social 
structures which have contributed to Baluch discontent, and fueled past and present 
violence.   
Attempts to crush the nationalist movement through military means alone will 
only temporarily delay violence, not stop it.  Additionally, if military action is viewed as 
wanton, as it was in 1977, it will ultimately breed the type of contempt for the central 
government, and more generally for ethnic Punjabis who are associated with it, that may 
result in more violence.  To be comprehensive, the central governments approach to 
Baluchistan must include intermediate steps that build confidence among both political 
elites as well as the masses.  This will require an expansion of the development programs 
in Baluchistan to include more locally focused projects.  Additionally, the central 
government must prove to the Baluch people that it respects the political rights of the 
provinces and won’t arbitrarily revoke those rights when it suits their needs.  While 
building confidence among the Baluch will be difficult based on the history of the 
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interaction between the province and the central government, it is an imperative step 
towards a peaceful resolution to the crisis. 
4. Address the Larger Issues  
Violent conflict tends to breed further violence.142  Unfortunately, because 
Baluchistan has a long history of violence, bringing an end to it is a very difficult task.  
Yet the longer this current crisis lingers, the more intractable it will become.  Because 
this conflict is in essence over identity—what it means to be a Baluch, or for that matter, 
Sindhi, Pashtun, or Punjabi in Pakistan—positions at the negotiation table are not easily 
divisible or reconcilable.143  Yet this issue of identity in Pakistan must be addressed if 
peace and stability are to return to Baluchistan, and remain in place throughout greater 
Pakistan.  The central government has long been fearful that granting autonomy to its 
provinces will ultimately result in the dismemberment of Pakistani state.  Because of this, 
it has maintained its intolerance for nationalist movements and moved quickly in the past 
to crush them militarily.  Yet far from solving the nationalism problem, addressing the 
ethic aspirations of its disparate population with military force alone has not resolved the 
identity issue, only postponed further violence.   
Wrapped up in the issue of identity is the struggle between modernity and the 
tribal society entrenched in Baluchistan.  The tribal leaders have a vested interest in 
keeping their tribes beholden to them.  The central government has sought to break this 
link by exposing the Baluch people to the benefits of modernization.  Because of the over 
emphasis on large scale projects, and the intransigence of the tribal leaders, the benefits 
of modernization have yet to touch the Baluch populace.  But modernization alone will 
not break the feudal ties inherent to Baluchistan.  This will only be accomplished if the 
central government is able to replace ethnic-nationalism—in Baluchistan, or in any other 
province—with a civic-nationalism buttressed by strong political institutions.  The first 
step toward this development is to directly address the issues of ethnic identity and  
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autonomy in Pakistan.  Failure to do so now will only prolong Pakistan’s problems, 
entrench grievances with the central government, and prevent Pakistan from emerging as 
a strong and stable state.    
5. Role of the United States 
The current crisis in Baluchistan is worthy of increased U.S. attention because of 
its value as an indicator of the growing trend of political violence throughout the region.  
As discussed above, the recent spate of violence in Baluchistan is a product of various 
variables—both long-standing and more recent.  A variable discussed only briefly here 
but worthy of future study is the impact in Baluchistan of the seemingly growing 
contagion within Pakistan, and the region more broadly, that is vehemently anti-United 
States, and as a result, exceedingly opposed to any government that is viewed as 
supporting U.S. objectives.  The presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s western 
border area is of immense concern to both the United States and Pakistan.  While it is 
unclear to what extent these vehemently anti-U.S., anti-Musharraf elements have 
influenced events in Baluchistan—their efforts to date have been primarily focused on 
Afghanistan—the growing presence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda within Baluchistan is 
indeed troubling.  The danger these elements present is in the possibility that they will 
coalesce with the more nationalistic, and less religious Baluch tribesmen who have taken 
up arms against the central government.  More broadly this is a concern because 
Baluchistan has the potential to become yet another battle front where radical Islamists, 
such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban, wage war on freedom and democracy.  If indeed this 
occurs, it could thrust the entire Muslim world into utter chaos.   
U.S. analysts and policy makers should be cognizant of potential indicators that 
demonstrate that the Baluch nationalist movement is morphing into part of the “global 
jihad” that is being led by Osama bin Laden and others.  These indicators include the 
influx of weapons, technology, foreign fighters, as well as the tactics and techniques—
such as the use of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, etc.—that have 
become prevalent in places such as Iraq and, more recently Afghanistan.  If the Baluch 
crisis develops into yet another front of this global jihad, the consequences for the United 
States and the entire international community are dire indeed.      
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The current crisis in Baluchistan should also concern the United States because of 
its impact on stability in Pakistan.  A stable Pakistan is in the best interest of the United 
States for a whole host of reasons.  Not only is Pakistani cooperation in the Global War 
on Terror crucial to the efforts of the United States, but a stable Pakistani state lessens the 
possibility that the standoff between Pakistan and India will end in nuclear conflict.  
While the crisis in Baluchistan is an internal matter, its importance to the regional 
dynamics in South Asia require that the United States strongly encourage the Musharraf 
government to not just quell the violence, but resolve the crisis.  Resolution to the crisis, 
however, will be unattainable without addressing the fundamental issues that are at its 
roots.   
The United States must encourage Pakistan to expand on its two pronged 
approach to the present Baluchistan crisis and include more concrete steps to not only 
improve education and job training, but most importantly, to institute democratic reforms 
and to address the issue of provincial sovereignty within Pakistan.  These reforms must 
guarantee the participation of provincial authorities in the state and local decision making 
process; strengthen political institutions; and, in doing so, legitimize the efforts of the 
central government in the eyes of the Baluch people.   
Ultimately, it is in the best interest of both the United States and Pakistan that the 
crisis in Baluchistan be resolved sooner rather than later.  The longer the conflict lingers, 
the more entrenched Baluch militants will become; the more tenuous Musharraf’s grip on 
power will become; and the window of opportunity for foreign jihadis to intervene will 
only widen.      
D. CONCLUSION 
The Baluch have fiercely resisted outside rule throughout their history and the fact 
that they continue today to resist the central government’s efforts to establish the writ of 
law in Baluchistan is of little surprise.  The intent of this thesis has been to ascertain the 
critical factors contributing to violence in Baluchistan throughout history in order to 
disaggregate the root causes of the present crisis.  The argument that has been supported 
here is that the current spate of violence in Baluchistan has been a product of preexisting 
factors—the independent nature of the Baluch people; the legacy of British and Pakistani 
policy; and historical grievances that have allowed Baluch leaders to mobilize Baluch 
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tribesmen to take up arms against the central government—that have been exacerbated by 
a major change in the relationship between the central government and the Baluch 
people.   
Throughout history, this changed relationship has been brought about by the 
specific techniques used by the ruling authority—both British and Pakistani—to exert 
control over Baluchistan.  These techniques, which have varied greatly over time and 
have had varying degrees of success, have included attempts at direct domination, co-
optation, and appeasement.  Government policies aimed at co-opting and/or appeasing 
Baluch leaders, such as the Forward Policy and Zia’s “non-provocative firmness,” have 
led to more peaceful relations between the central government and the Baluch people, yet 
these policies also failed to directly confront the underlying causes of Baluch discontent.  
As a result, when geo-strategic circumstances drove the governing authority to move 
towards a policy of more direct control, as was the case with the British after the First 
Afghan War and is the case presently, underlying grievances were exacerbated and 
violence flared.  Past governments have curbed violence in Baluchistan only when they 
abandoned their efforts at direct control and shifted back to policies of appeasement 
and/or co-optation.  The current crisis in Baluchistan, however, cannot be solved with a 
reversion to this type of policy.  The strategic significance of Baluchistan is such that the 
Pakistani government cannot simply withdraw.  Even if U.S. pressure on Pakistan to 
secure its western border area subsides in future years, the central government is far too 
dependent on the port of Gwadar for future economic success and strategic security to 
simply cede control back to the tribal sardars in Baluchistan.   
It is imperative then that the central government work towards a legitimate 
solution to the conflict.  The pattern of violence throughout the history of Baluchistan 
leads to the conclusion that the present situation in Baluchistan cannot be resolved 
without addressing the historical causes of violence in the province.  The Musharraf 
regime has gone to great lengths to demonstrate that it is dedicated to addressing the long 
standing grievance of the Baluch people concerning the lack of economic development of 
Baluchistan.  Other positive steps by the central government have included the 
integration of more Baluch into the armed forces and civil service, and increased 
investment in education and job training.  These efforts do represent a concerted effort by 
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the central government to address issues that are fundamental to quelling Baluch 
resentment toward the central government, but they need to be greatly expanded.  
Ultimately though, the crisis in Baluchistan is reflective of the greater struggle within 
Pakistan to determine, nearly sixty years after its creation, what its true identity is.  Until 
this issue is more adequately addressed, peace and stability in Baluchistan, and 
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